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THE FLUID NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN WATER 
SHELLEY ROSS SAXER* 
“If water were our chief symbol for property, we might think of 
property rights—and perhaps other rights—in a quite different way.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding how the right to use water is characterized in 
property terms is vital for efficiently allocating and reallocating this 
essential resource.2 Because property “is the symbolic means through 
which people convey and receive the meaning of all rights,”3 much 
great scholarship is devoted to exploring the concept of property 
rights in water. However, as one recent scholar observed, the law on 
“whether interests in water are legally recognized as property [is] 
surprisingly unsettled” with no consistent answers.4 In writing this 
article, I struggled to resolve for myself whether water rights should 
be classified as property and whether they should be subject to 
private ownership. As a strong proponent of private property rights, 
who seeks to find a property interest in everything, I nevertheless 
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 1. Carol M. Rose, Property As the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 351 
(1996) (arguing for a “more fluid and cooperative vision of property”). 
 2. See Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 205, 209 
(2007) (noting that “[f]undamental choices in how society defines property rights influence the 
resource’s efficient allocation and reallocation”). 
 3. Rose, supra note 1, at 349, 351 (observing that since water is “the subject of important 
and valuable property rights,” if we used water instead of land as “our chief symbol for 
property, we might think of property rights—and perhaps other rights—in a quite different 
way”). 
 4. Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 
679, 681–87 (2008) (suggesting that Professor Craig A. Arnold’s metaphor of property as a “web 
of interests” be applied to understanding property rights in water instead of the “bundle of 
rights” metaphor). 
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conclude that water is too unlike land to be subject to private 
property holdings. 
Instead of viewing water through the lens of the bundle of sticks 
metaphor for land ownership, we should use the public trust doctrine 
with its rich history in the U.S. legal tradition to determine rights to 
this resource.5 Water is a crucial public resource, and its fluid nature 
requires that the government limit private rights to the “right to use” 
water that ultimately belongs to the public and is held in trust for us 
by the government. The characteristics of this essential resource 
compel a comparison to air and fish, not to land. I am persuaded by 
the argument that “[p]ublic rights are just as essential to a healthy and 
functioning democratic society as are private rights”6 and water 
interests should belong to the public. By expanding the public trust 
doctrine to support a public stewardship model,7 the management and 
allocation of this unique common resource will be entrusted to the 
government for the public good. 
One of the driving forces in bringing the issue of water rights to 
the public consciousness is the continuing struggle to keep sufficient 
instream flows to prevent harm to endangered species and habitats.8 
This struggle pits public rights to natural resources against private 
rights to receive water for agricultural, fishing, and urban uses.9 
 
 5. See Craig Anthony Arnold, Water Privatization Trends in the United States:  Human 
Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
785, at 808–09, 836–38 (2009); cf. Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks:  Land as a 
Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773 (2002) (proposing somewhat in reverse that land 
be viewed as a community resource like water, and that rather than using the bundle of sticks 
metaphor for land, we should emphasize the interconnectedness of rights). 
 6. Carol Necole Brown, Drinking From a Deep Well: The Public Trust Doctrine and 
Western Water Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006). 
 7. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 840–49 (asserting that the public trust doctrine is too 
limited to ensure the government stewardship required and arguing for a shared responsibility 
between the public and the government “for being good and wise stewards of limited water 
resources that are essential to life, society, and nature”). 
 8. See Timothy M. Mulvaney, Instream Flows and the Public Trust, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
315, 317 (2009) (“Failure to preserve sufficient instream flows can result in a variety of harmful 
effects, including reduced marine habitats, lower seafood production, higher concentrations of 
pollutants in waters utilized for human consumption, and diminished capacity of waterways to 
support recreational activities such as fishing, boating, and swimming.”); Holly Doremus & A. 
Dan Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
279, 310 (2003) (noting that the quantity of instream water may directly affect aquatic life or 
may indirectly cause adverse impacts “because the quantity of water is closely related to 
temperature and other important water quality characteristics”). 
 9. See Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 8, at 282 (observing that the costs of strictly 
enforcing the Endangered Species Act “are especially high when the ESA is applied to water 
resources, since compliance with ESA mandates may require the holders of state-created water 
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Although the Endangered Species Act (ESA)10 has been in existence 
for over forty years, the conflicts between state water rights and the 
ESA taking prohibition have escalated since the early 1990s, as the 
increasing demand for water resulted in the over-appropriation of 
water resources.11 
State, federal, and international jurisdictions recognize some 
measure of private property rights in water, although each jurisdiction 
determines the extent to which private water rights will be considered 
protected ownership interests.12 In the arid West, the right to use 
water can be one of the most valuable property rights to be legally 
recognized,13 and eastern states are also facing issues of water scarcity 
as population increases and exhaustion of groundwater resources 
drive regions to compete for this precious resource.14 When protecting 
endangered or threatened species under the ESA by maintaining 
instream water flows directly competes with valuable state property 
rights to use water, ESA protection may ultimately prevail on the 
 
rights to reduce or even forego long established entitlements”); id. at 288 (“Unless irrigated 
agriculture can find a way to integrate itself into the changing landscape of the new West, it may 
be overrun by growing societal demands for water for cities and environmental restoration.”). 
 10. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006). 
 11. Cori S. Parobek, Of Farmers’ Takes and Fishes’ Takings:  Fifth Amendment 
Compensation Claims When the Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights Collide, 27 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 193 (2003). 
 12. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, A Conversation About Takings and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 1985, 1990–91 (2005) (noting that California state law provides that “’[a]ll water within the 
State is the property of the people of the State”’) (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 2005) 
(repealing CAL. CIV. CODE § 1410 as amended by 1911 Cal. Stat. 821)). 
 13. David Abelson, Comment, Water Rights and Grazing Permits:  Transforming Public 
Lands into Private Lands, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 407, 407 (1994). 
 14. See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Have We Got a Deal For You:  Can the East Borrow From 
the Western Water Marketing Experience?, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 449, 449–52 (2004) (noting that 
“the East has been relatively water-rich” until recently, but that water disputes are occurring 
due to increasing demand); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Developing a Suitable Water Allocation Law 
for Pennsylvania, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2–4 (2006) (noting that Pennsylvania may require 
more administrative regulation of water use because of recurring droughts and climate change); 
Steven T. Miano & Michael E. Crane, Eastern Water Law:  Historical Perspectives and Emerging 
Trends, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 14, 14 (2003) (observing that “eastern water supplies 
have become increasingly erratic due to overuse, short-term droughts, and potential long-term 
climatic changes” and that development patterns have created addition problems with water 
pollution of existing resources and salt water intrusion into groundwater supplies because of 
overpumping of aquifers in coastal regions); Robert Haskell Abrams, Water Federalism and the 
Army Corps of Engineers’ Role In Eastern States Water Allocation, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 395, 397 (2009) (explaining that “this Article proceeds on the premise that water is no 
longer relatively plentiful in an increasing number of basins found in the humid eastern states”). 
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theory that “no one owns the right to extinguish a form of life on 
earth.”15 
The historical development of water law centers on rights to 
surface water, as opposed to groundwater, since the lack of early 
scientific knowledge about groundwater limited our understanding of 
the extent of this water resource and its interconnectedness with 
surface water. Therefore, the majority of case law and scholarship 
focuses on surface water, and so these water rights have received the 
most attention and legal refinement, as will be described in Part II of 
this article. Nevertheless, groundwater resources are growing in 
importance, and in Part III, the article will explore the property 
characteristics of groundwater and the aquifer structures in which 
groundwater is stored. Part IV will briefly discuss property rights in 
rainwater, which, surprisingly to some, may also be limited as we 
attempt to manage these resources in conjunction with surface and 
groundwater rights. Finally, in Part V, the article will examine how 
these property classifications of water impact legal issues involving 
constitutional rights, such as the Takings Clause16 and due process 
under both federal and state constitutions; water marketing;17 and the 
privatization of public resources.18 
The article will conclude by suggesting that jurisdictions 
recategorize water rights as contract rights or licensing rights, 
 
 15. Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say 
About Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute “Takings”?, 80 
IOWA L. REV. 297, 332 (1995); see also Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fisherman’s Ass’ns v. Gutierrez, 606 
F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1201–02 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (finding certain water rights under service contracts 
subject to the ESA); Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits In Principle and Practice, 14 PENN ST. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 251, 258–59 (2006) (noting that in water permitting programs, “one significant 
problem has been the protection of ‘instream’ uses of water” such as retaining instream water to 
promote recreational environmental uses of water). 
 16. This Part will also discuss the concept of “givings” as “[a]ny government redistribution 
of private property necessarily involves givings and takings, and any government destruction of 
property can be matched with a government creation of property.”  Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 563 (2001). 
 17. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 206–07 (proposing that appropriative water rights are 
usufructuary rights and thus cannot function in markets to allow instream water rights to be 
privately purchased to “compete in the market for water against traditional consumptive uses”). 
 18. See Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform:  Putting Theory, Policy, and 
Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1153 (explaining that proponents of private 
ownership of natural resources consider such a policy to be “more economically efficient than 
public ownership”); Rose, supra note 1, at 331 (noting that treating natural resources such as 
water as unmanaged commons tends to deplete them while promoting security in property 
rights and will “induce us to invest, trade, and gently monitor each other”); Reza Dibadj, 
Regulatory Givings and the Anticommons, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1041, 1088 (2003) (noting the 
argument that “privatization encourages investment because it provides certainty”). 
Saxer_cpcxns 10/12/2011  3:47:06 PM 
Fall 2010] THE FLUID NATURE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN WATER 53 
revocable by the government for the public good.19 Under the public 
trust doctrine, federally reserved rights, and the navigation servitude, 
there is historical support for the concept that water belongs to the 
public, with ownership held by the government in trust for the people. 
While the majority of state legislatures and state and federal courts 
continue to talk about water rights in property terms, water rights are 
generally viewed not as actual property rights subject to a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment, but as usufructuary rights, or a license 
from the state or federal government that can be revoked and is 
governed by contract rights. This is similar to the treatment of grazing 
rights, fishing rights, or timber permits. 
Water rights may be defined as limited property rights under 
state law in order to prioritize private rights among citizens and 
establish a tradable permits system.20 Valuation of these rights is 
necessary for a properly functioning permit market and may also be 
required for corporations claiming these rights as assets.21 However, 
rights to use water can be valued without assigning ownership, in the 
same way that mining rights or grazing rights on federal land are 
valued. States should treat water as a public resource and hold 
ownership rights in trust for the public by recognizing the public trust 
doctrine22 and granting only private usufructuary rights that do not 
interfere with the public good. 
 
 19. While this Article does not discuss licenses that might become irrevocable if coupled 
with an interest in land, water has not historically been treated as a profit, which is typically 
treated the same as a license coupled with an interest.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Merrill v. Ohio 
Dept. of Natural Res., Nos. 2008-L-007, 2008-L-008, 2009 WL 2591758, at *66 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 21, 2009) (declining “to establish categorically whether all littoral rights are in the nature 
of a titled property interest, a franchise, a license, or a license coupled with an interest in land”); 
A.W. Walker, Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in 
Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 n.5 (1928) (“[C]ommon law is somewhat inconsistent as to the 
property in which profits may be created, denying their creation in the case of water on the 
ground that the landowner does not own the water . . . .”). 
 20. See, e.g., Western States Water Laws:  California Water Rights Fact Sheet, NAT’L SCI. & 
TECH. CTR., BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. (Aug. 15, 2001), http://www.blm.gov/nstc/ 
WaterLaws/california.html (explaining that “[a] water right in California is a property right 
allowing the use of water, but it does not involve ownership of the water” and also noting that 
water rights “can be held by any legal entity” and “are considered real property”). 
 21. Although the author could not locate authority to directly support this assertion 
regarding the issue of water rights and corporate borrowing, an October, 2009 conversation with 
Paul Singarella, a practicing attorney with Latham and Watkins, revealed that water rights are 
being used as corporate assets to secure financing. 
 22. See Brown, supra note 6, at 2 (proposing “that the public trust doctrine is being 
underutilized by the states and that the optimal approach to the western states’ water scarcity 
dilemma is one that applies the public trust doctrine more aggressively while simultaneously 
diminishing the applicability of the prior appropriation doctrine with its inherently private 
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II. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SURFACE WATER 
Riparian Rights, Prior Appropriation, and the Language of Property 
The two major legal regimes for water rights in this country are 
based on riparianism and the prior appropriation doctrine. However, 
a few western states, including California, Nebraska, and Oklahoma, 
have adopted a dual system of appropriation and riparianism, named 
the “California Doctrine.”23 Riparian water rights are primarily based 
upon property rights in land adjacent to a water resource rather than 
based on water use.24 Real property ownership entitles the landowner 
to use the nearby water, and the land value of these riparian parcels 
will reflect this advantageous water right. While riparian rights have 
been limited and subject to the public navigation right,25 they have 
nonetheless been considered valuable water rights.26 
The prior appropriation doctrine, developed in the arid regions 
of the western United States, gives water rights to the individual who 
first diverts the water and puts it to a beneficial use, regardless of land 
ownership.27 Under both the prior appropriation doctrine and riparian 
 
property approach to water resource entitlement”). But see, e.g., Scott Andrew Shepard, The 
Unbearable Cost of Skipping the Check:  Property Rights, Takings Compensation & Ecological 
Protection in the Western Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1063, 1067 (2009) 
(concluding that “efforts to undermine the compensable property-right status of water rights” 
are unsuccessful because historical and federal doctrines such as the public trust doctrine do not 
support these “compensation-stripping” proposals). 
 23. See GEORGE A. GOULD, DOUGLAS L. GRANT, & GREGORY S. WEBER, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 9 (7th ed. 2005). 
 24. Leshy, supra note 12, at 1987; see, e.g., Port of Portland v. Reeder, 280 P.2d 324, 333 
(1955) (finding that upland owners acquired such water rights “as inhere in riparian owners on 
navigable water, subject to the limitations”). 
 25. See, e.g., Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651, 654, 656 (1927) 
(noting that under Wisconsin state law “neither the riparian owner nor the state could develop 
water power by placing a dam in a navigable river resting upon its banks without the consent of 
the other, and that the state might withhold its permission or grant it on conditions”). 
 26. See Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 446 (1892) (recognizing riparian right as 
valuable property that “[can]not be arbitrarily or capriciously impaired”); Yates v. Milwaukee, 
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504 (1870) (“This riparian right is property, and is valuable . . . .”); In re 
Willow Creek, 144 P. 505, 515 (Or. 1914) (calling the riparian right a valuable interest “which 
should not to be ignored”). Cf., e.g., Ariz. Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1913) 
(acknowledging as a “special injury” suffered by a plaintiff contamination of the Gila River 
“affecting the . . . value of his property rights as a riparian owner”). 
 27. David L. Callies & Calvert G. Chipchase, Water Regulation, Land Use and the 
Environment, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 49, 83–84 (2007) (explaining that Colorado’s adoption of the 
doctrine of prior appropriation “grants water rights prioritized by the chronological order in 
which they were [obtained]” and that the doctrine generally requires: “(1) intent to make an 
appropriation; (2) taking or diverting the water from the stream; and (3) application of the 
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rights, there is debate over whether the water rights should be 
considered property in the traditional sense or whether they are 
merely rights to use the water. If we deem water to be a property 
right, government restrictions on the right to use water may result in a 
finding that water users must be justly compensated under the 
Takings Clause and may also generate due process or equal 
protection claims.28 
Even within these water law doctrines, jurisdictions vary as to 
how they view property rights in water and as to who actually owns 
interests in water.29 As the Court of Federal Claims observed in 
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States,30 there are many 
variations in the water laws of the western states, and the various 
approaches of these states can be divided into three different 
categories: (1) riparian; (2) prior appropriation; and (3) a dual system, 
which is a hybrid of the prior two.31 Under the prior appropriation 
doctrine portion of California’s dual system, the appropriator 
“acquires no property right or any other right against the state” until 
the state issues a permit and all the conditions of the permit have 
been met, which then converts the permit into a license.32 Additional 
 
water to beneficial use”); see also Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray, 173 P.3d 749, 757 (N.M. 2007) 
(explaining that under the appropriation doctrine, “the person who develops water by putting it 
to beneficial use becomes the owner of the water right and can put it to his own use, sell or lease 
it, or transfer it to a different place and purpose of use (subject to the requirement that it will 
not impair other rights)”); Mulvaney, supra note 8, at 324 (acknowledging that the first user of 
water obtains a senior appropriation right “[r]egardless of the proximity of the ultimate water 
use to the relevant water source”); Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 698 (noting that once 
appropriative water rights are obtained by putting water to a beneficial use, such rights “can be 
conveyed by deed, lease, mortgage, or inheritance as an appurtenance with a conveyance of the 
land where the water was initially put to use”). 
 28. See Parobek, supra note 11, at 211 (explaining that although water had been deemed a 
property right in several previous cases, interested parties were taken by surprise when the 
Court of Federal Claims in Tulare Lake ordered compensation for loss of water rights because 
of the ESA) (citing Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed Cl. 313 
(2001)). 
 29. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 516–18 (2005) 
(determining that the question as to who owns water rights under the Reclamation Act is 
controlled by state law, either that of Oregon or California); Hydro Res. Corp., 173 P.3d at 754 
(2007) (“[S]tate law controls any issues pertaining to water rights.”) (citing Andrus v. 
Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 613–14 (1978)); Kinross Copper Corp. v. State, 981 
P.2d 833, 840 (1999). 
 30. 67 Fed. Cl. at 522 n.25. 
 31. Id. (citing 1 WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN 
STATES 2–3 (1971)). 
 32. Brian E. Gray, The Property Right In Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW .J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
1, 15 (2002) (quoting E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 35 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Cal. 
1935)). 
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limitations on these water rights, such as reasonable use and the 
public trust doctrine, result in a “conclusion that water rights are—
and always were—fragile.”33 Recognizing this fragility of water rights, 
we should avoid a property label34 in favor of a more apt description 
such as usufructuary35 rights or “licenses,” which convey the limited 
extent of the right,36 or we should instead rely on other legal 
constructs, such as contract law.37 
Water is an unusual resource in that it is constantly changing in 
form, quantity, and location and is difficult to exclusively possess.38 
When viewed through the lens of the bundle of rights metaphor used 
for real property, the right to use water dons the classical 
characteristics of exclusivity, alienability, and utility.39 Through this 
view, “[w]ater rights are property rights and cannot be taken except 
for a public use and upon the payment of compensation.”40 However, 
it appears that some states view property rights in water differently 
than property rights in land, treating water as a communal right, 
 
 33. See id. at 16. 
 34. It should be noted that some commentators could argue that “there is no scholarly or 
judicial consensus regarding the definition of property,” so even a property label is unlikely to 
resolve the problem.  Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 579–80. 
 35. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 207 (noting that since “riparian and appropriative rights 
are fundamentally use-measured rights rather than quantity-measured rights” the parameters of 
the rights have been “determined by a specific use rather than a predetermined quantity”); id. at 
216 (suggesting that like riparian rights, appropriative rights should be viewed as usufructuary 
instead of exclusionary or based on quantity). 
 36. See infra Part II.B (discussing analogous natural resource licenses such as for mining, 
oil and gas, and grazing). 
 37. See, e.g., Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 540 (2005) 
(resolving the water rights dispute based on contract law rather than on property rights). 
 38. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 691–92 (“Water is a unique resource.”); Gray, supra 
note 32, at 2 (“[W]ater rights are a unique form of property—limited by hydrologic variability, 
competing demands, the doctrines of reasonable and beneficial use, and in some states overtly 
environmental laws such as the public trust and statutory directives to protect instream flows 
and water quality.”). 
 39. For a good discussion of the nature of property rights in general and property 
characteristics, see Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 701–13. 
 40. Callies & Chipchase, supra note 27, at 73; id. at 73 n.137 (citing numerous United States 
Supreme Court decisions supporting the proposition that “[w]ater rights are property rights and 
compensation is owed when water rights are taken for a public use”); see also James H. 
Davenport & Craig Bell, Governmental Interference With the Use of Water:  When Do 
Unconstitutional “Takings” Occur?, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 4 (2005) (“[T]here is little 
doubt that the right to use water, generally, is a legally defensible interest that stands on equal 
footing with other traditional property rights.”). 
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rather than as private property protected against government takings 
without just compensation.41 
Characteristics of water are distinguishable from other resources 
in that: water cannot be exclusively possessed; it constantly moves 
from surface to ground, to air, to consumption; and there is always 
uncertainty as to the quantity that will be available for use because 
“drought, precipitation, and variable human uses create ever-
changing circumstances.”42 As a resource necessary to human survival, 
water has historically been treated as a communal right.43 Indeed, 
many scholars argue that access to clean drinking water is a universal 
human right44 and this “Right of Thirst” appears to have pervasively 
existed over long periods of time and in multiple cultures.45 Unlike 
private land ownership, which is not required for survival, water is a 
human necessity with an elusive and fluid nature that should not be 
subject to private ownership. Water should not be compared to land 
under the bundle of rights metaphor in order to assign private 
interests to this public resource. Instead, the “web of interests” 
metaphor, proposed by Professor Tony Arnold, may more 
appropriately address the characteristics of water such that rights to 
this communal resource take into consideration the interrelatedness 
of things and people.46 
The personal property rights “rule of capture” doctrine, 
traditionally applied to the capture of wildlife, has also been applied 
to public resources such as water and minerals in order to allocate 
these resources to private ownership rights.47 Applying the “rule of 
 
 41. Leshy, supra note 12, at 1992–93 (citing California’s original Water Code, providing for 
compensation for a state taking only in the amount actually paid to the state for the water right, 
which was usually zero). 
 42. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 691–92. 
 43. See id. at 693–94 (discussing the history of water laws and the public trust doctrine and 
noting that “[t]here is ‘an astonishingly universal regard for communal values in water 
worldwide’”) (quoting Erin Ryan, Comment, Public Trust and Distrust:  The Theoretical 
Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 
478 (2001)). 
 44. But see Arnold, supra note 5, at 813–20 (discussing the difficulty of applying current 
legal doctrine, particularly in the United States, to support a human right in water). 
 45. See James Salzman, Thirst: A Short History of Drinking Water, 18 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 94, 120–21 (2006) (arguing for “the need to move away from simplistic dichotomies 
such as rights versus markets, or public versus private management”). 
 46. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 719–20 (citing Craig Anthony Arnold, The 
Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 
(2002)). 
 47. Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, The Pioneer Spirit and the Public Trust:  The 
American Rule of Capture and State Ownership of Wildlife, 35 ENVTL. L. 673, 675 (2005). 
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capture” doctrine to wildlife resources “encouraged resource 
exploitation . . . [and] promoted investment in capture technology.”48 
In the end, this exploitation led to wildlife overharvesting in the 
nineteenth century.49 However, “virtually all states continue to claim 
ownership of wildlife within their borders,” which allows them to 
“own wildlife in trust for their citizens” and restrain capture 
accordingly.50 Consequently, other natural resources to which the rule 
of capture has been applied, namely water, should be similarly subject 
to state trust obligations and thus protected from private exploitation 
that conflicts with the public interest.51 State restraints on using water 
should not subject the government to constitutional limitations, such 
as the Takings Clause, that it would otherwise face when regulating 
private property.52 
Without defining the term “property,” some western states have 
specifically identified water rights as protected property.53 For 
example, in Montana, the state constitution provides that “all . . . 
waters within the boundaries of the state are the property of the state 
for the use of its people,”54 and in Colorado, the state supreme court 
has noted that “[w]hatever the exact nature of the property interest, 
water rights . . . can be conveyed and the quality of the title may be 
warranted much like with real property.”55 However, early Colorado 
law also declared that a water right, while rising “to the dignity of a 
distinct usufructuary estate, or right of property,” is limited in that it 
must be used for a beneficial purpose and is subject to prior 
appropriations.56 Unlike many other western states, it appears that 
Colorado recognizes strong property rights in water and vests these 
rights to support an active water market without much regard for 
public trust interests.57 
 
 48. Id. at 690. 
 49. See id. at 719. 
 50. Id. at 719–20. 
 51. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the public trust doctrine and limitations on property 
rights in water). 
 52. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 47, at 719 (“[S]tate regulation of wildlife harvests and 
wildlife habitat may be insulated from takings claims due to the state ownership doctrine.”). 
 53. See Abelson, supra note 13, at 419–20 (noting generally that the notion of water as “a 
form of property is deeply rooted in the traditions of the West[,]” specifically discussing 
Colorado and Montana). 
 54. See id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3, cl. 3). 
 55. Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374, 1377–78 (Colo. 1982). 
 56. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446–47 (1882). 
 57. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 733–34 (observing that in Colorado “[t]he 
public trust doctrine has limited import, and water rights are granted and can be transferred 
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Eastern states are reevaluating their earlier views of the nature 
of property rights in water as they confront changes in supply and 
demand and face water shortages in regions once viewed as water-
rich.58 Some states are increasing management of water allocation 
through the use of permits and are moving away from common law 
doctrines that are not equipped to deal with surface and groundwater 
shortages.59 Recent water scarcity woes have also encouraged states to 
turn towards market solutions in the public and private sectors 
through the commodification of water.60 Finally, as Professor Robin 
Kundis Craig notes in her comprehensive article, A Comparative 
Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, 
Property Rights, and State Summaries, several eastern states have 
been influenced by California decisions to expand their state public 
trust doctrine to include water rights and ecological protection.61 
Academic approaches to property rights in water are muddied as 
well. For example, one scholar concludes that “in most, if not all, 
states and in most, if not all, circumstances, municipalities and 
irrigation districts or district members [with contracts with the U.S. 
Bureau of Reclamation] do have property rights under state law.”62 
Yet, in the same article, the author states that “[a] water right, 
whether obtained under the riparian doctrine or the appropriation 
doctrine, is a usufruct, that is, it confers no ownership of the flowing 
water but only allows its holder to take and use waters belonging to 
the public or the state.”63 Finally, the author concludes that while the 
 
with no regard for the general public interest”).  But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-102 
(West 2009) (“[A]ll water in or tributary to natural surface streams, not including nontributary 
ground water . . . originating in or flowing into this state have always been and are hereby 
declared to be the property of the public, dedicated to the use of the people of the state . . . .”). 
 58. See Miano & Crane, supra note 14, at 14; Arnold, supra note 5, at 786 (“[T]he U.S. 
Southeast now struggles with drought, relentless and growing demand for water, depleting water 
sources, and persistent conflicts among major water users.”). 
 59. See Miano & Crane, supra note 14, at 14 (“[M]ost laws used to regulate water use in 
many eastern states have not really kept pace with the changes in water supply and demand 
patterns.”). 
 60. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 810–12. 
 61. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide To the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 
19–20 (discussing the impact of the California Supreme Court decisions Marks v. Whitney, 491 
P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) and Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728–31 (Cal. 
1983) on eastern states). 
 62. Douglas L. Grant, ESA Reductions in Reclamation Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth 
Amendment Taking of Property?, 36 ENVTL. L. 1331, 1334–35 (2006). 
 63. Id. at 1364. 
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water interest is a usufruct and confers no ownership, it may still be 
subject to a physical taking.64 
So we learn that water users have property rights under state law, 
but that these rights are usufructuary and do not confer ownership—
only the right to take and use waters belonging to the state. However, 
we are also told that in some cases the state may be required to pay 
just compensation to a water user.65 How then do we decide what is 
the property interest at issue (an ownership right or a right to use), 
who owns the property (the state or an individual), and whether these 
rights are subject to a takings claim? The Court of Federal Claims in 
Klamath Irrigation District addressed these issues stating that, “[i]n 
applying these [takings] principles to water, it is important to 
understand that the issue here is not who owns the water.”66 The court 
made it clear that the states at issue own the property rights to water 
in trust for the public, precluding any private property rights to 
water.67 
Commentators, courts,68 and laypersons alike insist on 
recognizing a property right in water and boldly state that “[t]he right 
to the use of water in the arid region is among the most valuable 
property rights known to the law.”69 However, the fluid nature of 
water rights makes it difficult to grasp whether water rights are 
property, as defined by our land-based, bundle-of-rights approach to 
understanding property,70 or whether we should use a different 
metaphor and baseline to describe water rights.71 Developing an 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding 
the government’s actions to be a taking of Casitas’ right to the water). 
 66. 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 515 (2005) (emphasis added). 
 67. See id. (noting that, under either Oregon or California law, water within the state 
belongs to the public). 
 68. See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318–
19 (2001) (holding water use restrictions imposed under the ESA constituted a physical taking); 
White v. Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co., 43 P. 1028, 1030 (Colo. 1896) (“The right to 
the use of water in the arid region is among the most valuable property rights known to the 
law.”) 
 69. Abelson, supra note 13, at 407. 
 70. See, e.g., Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray, 173 P.3d 749, 755 n.5. (N.M. 2007) (“‘[N]either 
surface water, nor ground water, nor the use rights thereto, nor the water-bearing capacity of 
natural formations belong to a landowner as a stick in the property rights bundle.’”) (quoting 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Park Cnty. Sportsmen’s Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 707 (Colo. 2002) (en 
banc)). 
 71. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 838–39 (discussing the author’s metaphor using a web-of-
interests concept for property interests in water and the suggestion by Professors Zellmer and 
Harder that this is the appropriate metaphor). 
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alternative approach to water rights needs to be informed by 
understanding existing limitations on these rights and how the 
limitations impact the fluidity of the rights. 
Limitations on Property Rights 
Property rights may be limited based upon state law defining 
what constitutes the property right, or by state or federal law 
subsequently imposing conditions on usage.72 As the water law 
regimes developed, states placed limitations on the water rights based 
upon scarcity and the need to allocate these resources to increasingly 
competitive interests.73 State law may declare that the public owns all 
waters in the state and that certain conditions and limitations apply. 
For example, states may require that water not be wasted, that it be 
used reasonably, that it be efficiently diverted, and that water rights 
are subject to regulation to benefit the public.74 In addition, the public 
trust doctrine and the navigation servitude limit riparian and 
appropriation water rights such that “water rights actually have less 
protection than most other property rights,” and these limitations are 
inherent in the definition of water rights.75 Finally, external factors 
 
 72. See id. at 807 (discussing the various common law doctrines that limit private rights in 
water); Jan G. Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests In 
Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 71 (1987) (“[I]f the terms of the interest acquired 
by a party give notice that the interest may be subject to later conditions, eventual imposition of 
conditions is neither unreasonable nor is it a taking.”). 
 73. See Scott S. Slater, State Water Resource Administration in the Free Trade Agreement 
Era: As Strong as Ever, 53 WAYNE L. REV. 649, 668–69 (2007) (discussing the typical practice of 
states to condition the right to continued use of water upon compliance with state laws 
governing, including, for example, “the method and timing of withdrawals, storage, distribution, 
use and discharge”); Dale B. Thompson, Of Rainbows and Rivers: Lesson for 
Telecommunications Spectrum Policy from Transitions in Property Rights and Commons in 
Water Law, 54 BUFFALO L. REV. 157, 176 (2006) (“After initial attempts to use riparian 
doctrine in the Western United States ran into difficulties, the prior appropriation doctrine was 
established to deal with the scarcity of water supplies presented in the West.”); Olivia S. Choe, 
Note, Appurtenancy Reconceptualized: Managing Water in an Era of Scarcity, 113 YALE L.J. 
1909, 1912 (2004) (discussing the development of statutory efforts to place limitations on water 
use by riparian owners “often adopted in response to scarcity concerns”). 
 74. See Abelson, supra note 13, at 420–21 (noting that under both Colorado and Nevada 
law, the view that “[w]ater belongs to the state for the benefit of the public” is “supported by 
both the public trust doctrine and the navigational servitude”). 
 75. Id. at 421–23 (“[T]he subsequent exercise of state authority to regulate water rights is 
not a redefinition or repudiation of a water right, but is instead a recognition of inherent 
limitations imbued in any water right.”). 
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such as floods, droughts, and groundwater extraction limit the 
certainty and availability of water rights.76 
Reasonableness and Beneficial Use 
Most jurisdictions, either riparian or appropriation, or a hybrid 
of the two, limit water rights based on the requirement that the water 
use be reasonable.77 Riparian jurisdictions originally recognized 
absolute ownership rights to adjacent watercourses based on the 
natural flow theory from English common law.78 The natural flow 
theory provides that “‘[e]ach riparian owner on a waterbody is 
entitled to have the water flow across . . . the land in its natural 
condition, without alter[ation] by others of the rate of flow, or the 
quantity or quality of the water.’”79 However, during the nineteenth 
century many eastern states adopted the reasonable use limitation on 
riparian rights, also called the American Rule, which provides that 
“all riparian owners bordering a common watercourse have an equal 
right to use the water for all reasonable lawful purposes, as long as 
such use does not cause unreasonable harm to other riparians.”80 
Reasonable use is determined by balancing the riparian owner’s 
needs against the needs of other riparian owners and taking into 
consideration the facts and circumstances of each situation.81 The 
reasonable use doctrine addressed the East’s shift from an 
agricultural society to an industrialized economy by changing 
common law water rights to accommodate community needs.82 
 
 76. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 699; see also Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 9, at 
301 (“State entitlements are subject both to climate variability, which can substantially reduce 
the amount of water available to junior right-holders, and to federal law . . . .”). 
 77. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 694 (noting that after the Industrial Revolution, 
“[t]he principle of undiminished natural flow evolved into the doctrine of reasonable use, which 
allows all reasonable uses of water on the riparian tract, even if natural flows are diminished”). 
 78. See Christine A. Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & Richard Hamann, Modernizing Water 
Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 415 (2009). 
 79. R. Timothy Weston, Harmonizing Management of Ground and Surface Water Use 
under Eastern Water Law Regimes, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 239, 247 (alterations in 
original) (citing 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(c) (Amy K. Kelly ed., repl. vol. 2007) 
(Robert E. Beck ed., 1991)). 
 80. Klein, Angelo & Hamann, supra note 78, at 415 (citing Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 
So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 1950)); see also Choe, supra note 73, at 1930–34 (discussing reasonable use 
as doctrine). 
 81. 78 AM. JUR. 2D Waters § 33 (West 2009). 
 82. Marcia Valiante, The Future of Common Law Water Rights in Ontario, 14 J. ENVTL. L. 
& PRAC. 293, 308–09 (2004). 
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In prior appropriation or hybrid jurisdictions, water must be put 
to a beneficial use before any rights to the water can be acquired.83 
For example, under Nevada law, those who put water to a beneficial 
use are allowed the right to the use of the water, but they are not 
considered to “own title to the water.”84 The beneficial use 
requirement will prevent speculation or water hoarding, which would 
not constitute a diversion for a truly beneficial use. Therefore, those 
speculating or hoarding the water will not acquire any rights or title to 
the water.85 In California, “water rights are subject to the universal 
limitation that the use must be both reasonable and for a beneficial 
purpose.”86 Therefore, rights in surface water based upon prior 
appropriation within California are “measured by both the amount 
and the nature of the use to which the water may be put,” and 
changed conditions may result in what was once a beneficial use 
becoming a waste of water, unreasonable and unprotected as a 
property right.87 
In resolving how to mesh riparianism and prior appropriation 
doctrines, the California Supreme Court in Joslin v. Marin Municipal 
Water District88 made it clear that riparian rights would no longer exist 
if a new appropriation made a continuing riparian use unreasonable.89 
 
 83. See Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray, 173 P.3d 749, 755 n.5 (N.M. 2007) (“That appropriation 
of water to beneficial use produces a water right independently of ownership of the land is the 
majority position among those western states with a developed body of case law on that 
subject.”). 
 84. Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 210 (2008) (“Plaintiffs would have put 
the waters to beneficial use to irrigate their own agricultural pastures, or could have sold the 
water to others to use for the same purpose . . . .”). 
 85. See, e.g., Lanning v. Osborne, 76 F. 319, 332 (C.C.D. Cal. 1896) (noting that the 
California Constitution “provides that the water of natural streams may be diverted to 
beneficial use; but the privilege of diversion is granted only for uses truly beneficial, and not for 
the purposes of speculation”); Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater 
Mgmt. Dist., 77 P.3d 62, 78–79 (Colo. 2003) (“The anti-speculation doctrine precludes the 
appropriator who does not intend to put water to use for her own benefit, and has no contractual 
or agency relationship with one who does, from obtaining a water use right. . . . [A] person who 
intends to hold the right only to sell it or dispose of it for profit in the future, rather than acquire it 
for the purpose of applying water to an identified beneficial use, is not entitled to a determination 
of a water use right.”) (emphasis added); Combs v. Agric. Ditch Co., 28 P. 966, 968 (Colo. 1892) 
(“The [Colorado] constitution provides that the water of natural streams may be diverted to 
beneficial use; but the privilege of diversion is granted only for uses truly beneficial, and not for 
purposes of speculation.”) (interpreting COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6). 
 86. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 321 (2001) 
(citing CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3, amended by CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2). 
 87. Leshy, supra note 12, at 1996–98. 
 88. 429 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1967). 
 89. Id. at 898. 
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The court held that the riparians’ inverse condemnation claim for 
water rights destruction by an upstream dam was precluded by their 
unreasonable use as compared to the new appropriation for domestic 
water.90 In California, “[w]hat constitutes reasonable water use is 
dependent upon not only the entire circumstances presented but 
varies as the current situation changes”91 and by statute and judicial 
decision “‘[t]he use of water for recreation and preservation and 
enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of 
water.’”92 Therefore, in California and possibly in other states 
recognizing the public trust doctrine, the government requirement 
that water remain instream to protect public resources is considered a 
reasonable and beneficial water use. 
This fluid and changing nature of water rights, based upon the 
doctrine of reasonable use (and the public trust doctrine as well), 
makes these evolving definitions subject to challenge as an “ex post 
facto definition of the property right.”93 However, whether such a 
challenge, based on a retroactive definition, or a takings challenge 
will be successful is determined by whether the state’s property law 
supports a continuing reevaluation of the water right based on 
reasonableness. As a result, water rights will continue to be fragile 
when viewed as a property right according to our land-based 
standards.94 
Public Trust Doctrine 
The public trust doctrine reserves water rights for the public’s 
benefit and provides that the state has an obligation to preserve these 
resources for the people.95 These public rights to water and certain 
 
 90. Id. (“[S]ince there was and is no property right in an unreasonable use, there has been 
no taking or damaging of property by the deprivation of such use and, accordingly, the 
deprivation is not compensable.”); see also Gray, supra note 32, at 10 (citing Joslin). 
 91. Envtl. Def. Fund v. E, Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1980). 
 92. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 726 (Cal. 1983) 
(quoting CAL. WATER CODE § 1243). 
 93. Gray, supra note 32, at 15. 
 94. Id. at 15–17 (arguing that if courts require the government to pay for a taking when it is 
preventing an unreasonable use, water users receive a windfall). 
 95. See, e.g., Callies & Chipchase, supra note 27, at 69 (citing HAW. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7) 
(“Section 1 provides that ‘for the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its 
political subdivisions shall protect and conserve . . . all natural resources, including . . . water.’  
Section 7 explains that ‘[t]he State has an obligation to protect, control, and regulate the use of 
Hawaii’s water resources for the benefit of its people.’” (alterations in original)); id. at 92 
(“Despite a trend toward private water rights and capitol [sic] improvement, ‘the Constitution 
of New Mexico declares that the unappropriated waters of the state “belong to the public.”  This 
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other natural resources are recognized under the common law public 
trust doctrine as being “held in trust for the benefit and use of all 
people.”96 The doctrine’s reach originated with the “ownership of 
lands washed by the tides and lying beneath navigable waters.”97 In 
the United States, the concept of “state ownership of public resources 
in trust for all citizens . . . began with the 1821 New Jersey Supreme 
Court decision Arnold v. Mundy” where the Court held that New 
Jersey’s navigable waters, and submerged lands beneath them, were 
vested in the state and were destined for the use of all citizens based 
upon English common law.98 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted the 
New Jersey approach in 1842 in Martin v. Waddell and further 
expanded this public trust doctrine in 1855 in Smith v. Maryland and 
in 1891 in Manchester v. Massachusetts to eventually cover both water 
resources and wildlife.99 According to the Court’s 1891 decision in 
 
expression of public ownership has been construed to mean that the members of the public have 
the right to appropriate water for their private use, but it has also been construed to vest the 
state with ownership of the resource.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Charles T. Dumars, 
Changing Interpretations of New Mexico’s Constitutional Provisions Allocating Water Resources: 
Integrating Private Property Rights and Public Values, 26 N.M. L. REV. 367, 368 (1996)); 
Abelson, supra note 13, at 421–22 (noting that “[t]he public trust doctrine holds that the 
submerged beds and banks of navigable for title waters went to the states upon statehood” and 
that the state has an obligation based upon public trust “to preserve these waters for public uses 
such as navigation, commerce, and fishing”).  But see Callies & Chipchase, supra note 27, at 95 
(arguing that the Hawaii court in both the Wai’ahole decision and in a new decision, Kukui 
(Molokai), Inc., “continued to overstate both the place of the public trust doctrine in disputes 
governed by statute and the preeminence of native Hawaiian rights in water allocation 
matters”). 
 96. Mulvaney, supra note 8, at 318; see also id. at 350–51 (observing that this doctrine has 
been expanded in some states to cover “periodically and recreationally navigable waters and 
their tributaries, adjacent wetlands, artificial reservoirs and lands covered by water caused by 
dams, flooded lands, and groundwater”). 
 97. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 727–28 (1986). 
 98. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 47, at 693–94 (citing Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 52 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. 1821)); see also Rose, supra note 97, at 729 (“The first American case to apply the 
phrase [public trust] to waterways was Arnold v. Mundy in 1821 . . . .”); Jack Tuholske, Trusting 
the Public Trust:  Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to Groundwater Resources, 9 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 189, 214 (2008) (“Early American jurisprudence adopted England’s version [of the 
public trust doctrine], which holds navigable waters in trust for the public in order to protect 
navigability and promote commerce.”); Dibadj, supra note 18, at 1107 (“[The] earliest American 
manifestation [of the public trust doctrine] is the New Jersey Supreme court case of Arnold v. 
Mundy, where the defendant took oysters from an oyster bed which the plaintiff claimed belong 
to him under a land grant tracing back to the King of England.” (citation omitted)). 
 99. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 47, at 694–96 (explaining how the public trust doctrine 
was eventually extended to wildlife) (citing Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842), 
Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 75 (1855), and Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 
240 (1891)). 
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Knight v. United Land Association,100 this public trust obligation also 
covered public lands, requiring the Secretary of the Interior to protect 
public lands. Shortly thereafter, in 1892, the Court in Illinois Central 
Railroad v. Illinois101 clearly defined the public trust doctrine to 
require states to preserve navigable waters and submerged lands for 
the public’s use.102 These trust duties were later expanded by the 
California Supreme Court in National Audubon Society v. Superior 
Court of Alpine County (Mono Lake)103 to require the state to 
consider potential adverse effects of actions that might impair trust 
resources.104 
Each state has the authority to “hold in trust waters affected by 
the ebb and flow of the tide even where they are not navigable in 
fact.”105 California law has been interpreted to require the state Water 
Resources Control Board to ensure that the water permits it has 
issued continually comply with public trust requirements.106 This 
interpretation recognizes that “the state owns all of the water in the 
state, and [that] although water rights holders have the right to use 
water, they do not own the water and cannot waste it.”107 The Hawaii 
Supreme Court, in the Wai’ahole Ditch decision,108 affirmed that the 
public trust doctrine applied to all water resources in the state, 
including both navigable and non-navigable surface water and 
groundwater.109 It explained that “when land in Hawaii passed from 
the kingdom to private owners, the kingdom reserved title to all water 
to itself.”110 
 
 100. 142 U.S. 161, 177 (1891). 
 101. 146 U.S. 387, 452–53 (1892). 
 102. See Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 167 (Mont. 1984) 
(“The Public Trust Doctrine was first clearly defined in Illinois Central Railroad . . . .”); Rose, 
supra note 97, at 737–38 (“Illinois Central sparked a new line of state ‘public trust’ 
jurisprudence.”). 
 103. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
 104. Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 47, at 714–15. 
 105. Tuholske, supra note 98, at 216 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 
469, 483 (1988). 
 106. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 741 (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 
730–31). 
 107. Id. at 739–40 (noting criticism of Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United 
States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001), which “refused to recognize either the public trust doctrine or 
California’s constitutional requirement that uses of water be both beneficial and reasonable as 
an inherent limitation on title”). 
 108. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai’ahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000). 
 109. Id. at 440 (citing King v. Oahu Ry. & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717 (1899)). 
 110. Callies & Chipchase, supra note 27, at 69; see also Mulvaney, supra note 8, at 318–19 
(noting that Hawaii “became the first regulated riparian state to recognize explicitly that the 
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How western states other than California or Hawaii will handle 
applying the public trust doctrine to water rights is less apparent. 
Idaho by statute precludes applying the doctrine to water rights, but 
the Arizona Supreme Court struck down a similar statute, leaving it 
up to individual water-claims adjudications to determine how this 
doctrine should be applied.111 The Washington Supreme Court held 
that the doctrine could not be applied to water rights by the state 
water administration because there was no statutory authority.112 
However, the Ninth Circuit, in applying Washington state law to a 
dispute involving a residential development, described Washington 
State’s recognition of the public trust doctrine and affirmed that 
“Washington’s public trust doctrine ran with the title to the tideland 
properties and alone precluded the shoreline residential development 
proposed by Esplanade.”113 As Professor Douglas L. Grant observed, 
“the status of the public trust doctrine as a title limitation on water 
rights is uncertain at best in western states except for California and 
perhaps Arizona.”114 
It was suggested that local communities be responsible for 
managing public lands on a regional or watershed basis to keep the 
lands in public ownership and manage them in an ecologically 
sustainable manner.115 Utah provides for “comprehensive, watershed-
based planning and management for Great Salt Lake,”116 which 
necessarily impacts two other neighboring states because of their 
hydrologic connection to the watershed.117 Utah’s Constitution 
provides specifically that public lands and waters are protected under 
 
public trust doctrine operates independently of the state’s legislatively pronounced water 
code”). 
 111. See Grant, supra note 62, at 1376–77 (citing Act of Mar. 19, 1996, ch. 342, § 1, 1996 
Idaho Sess. Laws 1148-49 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1203 (2006)) and San Carlos 
Apache Tribe v. Superior Court, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999)). 
 112. See id. at 1377 (citing Rettkowski v. Dep’t of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232, 239 (Wash. 1993)). 
 113. Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985–86 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 114. Grant, supra note 62, at 1377; see also Rose, supra note 97, at 722 (“Despite its 
popularity, the modern public trust doctrine is notoriously vague as to its own subject matter; 
cases and academic commentaries normally fall back on the generality that the content of the 
public trust is ‘flexible’ in response to ‘changing public needs.’”). 
 115. See Keiter, supra note 18, at 1207 (discussing locally managed plans proposed by Daniel 
Kemmis and the Lubrecht group, respectively). 
 116. Robert W. Adler, Toward Comprehensive Watershed-Based Restoration and Protection 
for Great Salt Lake, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 99, 132 (1999). 
 117. Id. at 202 (discussing the need to include Idaho and Wyoming in some kind of 
interstate compact or other mechanism). 
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the public trust doctrine,118 but the Utah Department of Natural 
Resources has sought to include commercial and industrial 
development as public uses under the doctrine, in addition to the 
wildlife and ecological resources that are typically protected by it.119 If 
the public trust doctrine is considered to be constitutionally based, 
this potential conflict in competing public uses may require Utah to 
protect navigation, fish life, and ecological resources above local 
commercial and development interests, which are not typically 
considered under the doctrine to be protected public uses.120 
Eastern states have also struggled with defining the contours of 
the public trust doctrine.121 As discussed in the first part of this 
section, some eastern states, such as New Jersey and Massachusetts, 
already recognized a state public trust doctrine by the time the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois articulated a 
federal public trust doctrine.122 While several states currently regard 
the doctrine as primarily addressing navigation and commerce, 
similar to the federal view, some eastern states have been influenced 
by California’s decisions expanding the doctrine to include water 
rights and ecological protection.123 Thus, there is not a uniform state 
public trust doctrine recognized in either the West or the East. The 
significant differences that exist among the states may broaden as 
states respond to new public demands on water resources generated 
by development, scarcity, and climate change.124 
Federal Reserved Rights 
The federal government can limit both state and private water 
rights by asserting federal reserved rights, which “arise by reason of 
the creation of an Indian reservation or federal land management 
 
 118. Id. at 154 & n.324 (“State lands ‘are hereby accepted, and declared to be the public 
lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the people.’”) (quoting UTAH CONST. art. XX, § 
1). 
 119. Id. at 192. 
 120. See id. at 192–94 (urging “that a comprehensive watershed program for Great Salt Lake 
be driven by principles of watershed restoration and protection rather than resource use and 
development”). 
 121. See Craig, supra note 61, at 5 (noting that “several eastern states have embraced (at 
least rhetorically) a public trust concept that evolves and expands to fit the changing needs of 
society, while others remain fixed with the contours of the Supreme Court’s articulation of the 
doctrine”). 
 122. See id. at 5–6. 
 123. See id. at 19–20 (“[C]itations to California law are often an indication that eastern 
states are expanding their state public trust philosophies.”). 
 124. See id. at 25. 
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unit, such as a National Wildlife Refuge, for a water-related purpose” 
and do not require that the water be put to a beneficial use in order to 
retain the rights.125 These federally reserved rights are an exception to 
the general rule that “water rights are created by operation of state 
law.”126 The U.S. Supreme Court in Cappaert v. United States,127 
explained that “when the Federal Government withdraws its land 
from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose [such as 
a national park or forest], the Government, by implication, reserves 
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to 
accomplish the purpose of the reservation,” but only the amount 
needed to accomplish the purpose.128 The Court held that the 1952 
Proclamation declaring the Devil’s Hole cavern on federal land in 
Nevada to be a national monument was intended to reserve rights 
such that the United States had a right to maintain groundwater 
levels sufficient to preserve the scientific value of the pool in the 
cavern.129 Landowners withdrawing groundwater in the area of Devil’s 
Hole were therefore properly enjoined from pumping to the extent 
that such pumping caused the water level to drop below the point 
needed to support the unique fish living in the pool.130 
Federal reserved rights have been successfully asserted to retain 
instream flows sufficient to protect navigability, hunting, fishing, and 
aquatic habitat, as well as to provide for reasonable irrigation rights 
and biodiversity protection under the Endangered Species Act.131 
Some state and local governments also statutorily authorize agencies 
to retain instream water rights to protect environmental and 
recreational interests.132 Using federal reserved rights and the public 
trust doctrine, both the federal and state governments restrict, to 
some degree, private interests in water. The public trust doctrine may 
 
 125. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 8, at 303. 
 126. Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break:  Klamath Basin Water 
and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 197, 210 (2002). 
 127. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
 128. Id. at 138. 
 129. Id. at 147. 
 130. Id. at 141–43 (“The District Court thus tailored its injunction, very appropriately, to 
minimal need, curtailing pumping only to the extent necessary to preserve an adequate water 
level . . . .”). 
 131. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (federal government may reserve 
water rights from state appropriation); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 
U.S. 690, 709 (1899) (federal government has the right to restrict state appropriation of water if 
it interferes with navigability of the water body); Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 8, at 304–06. 
 132. Johnson, supra note 2, at 232–33 & n.102 (noting that Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, 
and Wyoming have enacted such legislation). 
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limit the state’s ability to convey ownership in water to private 
interests, while federal reserved rights prohibit either private interests 
or a state from interfering with interstate commerce and 
navigability.133 Private interests in instream rights are allowed in 
Alaska and Arizona, while Oregon and Washington do not allow such 
private rights, instead providing that the state holds such interests in 
trust for its citizens.134 Montana and Oregon allow for temporary 
water leases to private interests, and existing water users in California 
may “devote water rights to instream environmental uses, but not to 
appropriate for that purpose.”135 Nevertheless, because the federal 
government claims large amounts of water through reserved rights in 
national parks, forests, Indian lands, and federal projects, state and 
private claims to waters reserved by the federal government will 
necessarily involve the United States in determining water rights and 
water resources allocation.136 
Navigation Servitude 
Finally, riparian rights are subject to a navigation servitude, 
which means that a riparian owner is prohibited from obstructing 
navigation.137 The federal government’s power over navigation is 
based on the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, 
and the government is not required to compensate property owners 
when it needs to take action to protect the public’s interest in 
navigable waters.138 The federal navigation servitude has overridden 
even the riparian right of access to a watercourse protected under 
 
 133. See 65 C.J.S. Navigable Waters § 21 (2009). 
 134. Johnson, supra note 2, at 233–34. 
 135. Id. at 234–35. 
 136. See Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big is Big? The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under the 
McCarran Amendment, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 627 (1988) (discussing the McCarran 
Amendment, “which authorizes suits against the United States to determine the water rights of 
all parties claiming water from ‘a river system or other source’”). 
 137. See, e.g., Port of Portland v. Reeder, 280 P.2d 324, 341 (1955) (“The riparian rights of 
defendants did not include the right to obstruct navigation, and the removal of such obstructions 
which have been declared and are found to constitute a public nuisance will not ‘destroy or 
impair’ defendants’ riparian rights.”). 
 138. Pacheco, supra note 136, at 660; Leshy, supra note 12, at 1999; see also id. at 2013 
(noting that in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Justice Scalia cited Scranton 
v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 163 (1900), for an example of a background principle of state law 
“where the government exercised its navigation servitude and occupied someone’s (submerged) 
land without compensating the owner”). 
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state law,139 and it “supersedes any state-defined private property 
rights along the banks of navigable waters.”140 However, if the federal 
government’s main purpose in taking water rights is for irrigation and 
reclamation, the government may be required by congressional act to 
pay just compensation, even if the government’s actions would 
otherwise be authorized and not compensable under its navigation 
power.141 Congress may also decide “to compensate owners of 
submerged land in navigable waters” instead of relying on the 
servitude, but there is a presumption that no compensation need be 
paid “where a project has a legitimate navigation purpose, and there 
is no ascertainable Congressional intent to pay compensation.”142 
In United States v. Rands,143 the U.S. Supreme Court explained 
the history and the extent of the federal navigation servitude in 
deciding whether “the compensation which the United States is 
constitutionally required to pay when it condemns riparian land 
includes the land’s value as a port site.”144 The federal power to 
regulate navigation is based on the power to regulate commerce and 
“extends to the entire stream and the stream bed below the ordinary 
high-water mark.”145 Since riparian owners have always been subject 
to this commerce regulation, “the United States may change the 
course of a navigable stream or otherwise impair or destroy a riparian 
owner’s access to navigable waters, even though the market value of 
the riparian owner’s land is substantially diminished.”146 However, the 
Court held that in this case compensation had to be paid because the 
 
 139. See Abrams, supra note 14, at 401 (“[F]ederal projects promoting the national interest 
in navigation extinguished vital incidents of state law property rights without Fifth Amendment 
compensation.”). 
 140. Robin Kundis Craig, Valuing Coastal and Ocean Ecosystem Services: The Paradox of 
Scarcity for Marine Resources Commodities and the Potential Role of Lifestyle Value 
Competition, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 355, 377 (2007) (citing Oklahoma v. Atkinson, 313 
U.S. 508, 534 (1941); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931); Lewis Blue Point Oyster 
Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913)). 
 141. See United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 739–40 (1950) (concluding 
“that, whether required to do so or not, Congress elected [in the Reclamation Act of 1902] to 
recognize any state-created rights and to take them under its power of eminent domain”). 
 142. Coastal Petroleum Co. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1206, 1210 (Cl. Ct. 1976). 
 143. 389 U.S. 121 (1967). 
 144. Id. at 121. 
 145. Id. at 122–23. 
 146. Id. at 123 (citations omitted); see also Coastal Petroleum, 524 F.2d at 1209 
(“[N]avigation servitude is an extremely old concept—owners of property or property rights 
within navigable waters take those rights fully cognizant of their limited nature.”) (citing United 
States v. Kan. City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950); Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 
(1897)). 
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servitude did not extend beyond the high-water mark, but that the 
government did not need to include the “port site value as part of his 
compensation.”147 
The navigation servitude allows the federal government, and 
sometimes the state governments,148 to regulate navigable waters to 
the exclusion and derogation of private property interests, so long as 
the government is acting to protect navigation. Under the navigation 
servitude, the government, unless required to do so by Congress, will 
not be required to pay just compensation for interference with state-
created water rights because private claims to the public domain 
cannot be created.149 This servitude provides a limitation on private 
property rights in water, as do the previously discussed doctrines of 
federal reserved rights, the public trust doctrine, and the requirement 
that water be put to a reasonable and/or beneficial use. Therefore, 
even where a state appears to recognize the existence of property 
rights in water, these rights might be severely limited by federal or 
state law doctrines. 
Usufructuary Right to Use 
A usufruct in civil law is the “right for a certain period to use and 
enjoy the fruits of another’s property without damaging or 
diminishing it, but allowing for any natural deterioration in the 
property over time.”150 Thus, when water rights are labeled as 
usufructuary, such a label precludes consideration of these rights as 
private property rights, because by definition the water user has a 
right to enjoy the water, but the property ownership belongs to 
another—I would argue, the state. For example, “under California 
law the title to water always remains with the state.”151 In Estate of 
Hage v. United States (Hage V),152 the Court of Federal Claims 
explained, 
 
 147. 389 U.S. at 123–25.  But see Rivers and Harbors Act § 111 of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 595(a) 
(2000) (changing the result in Rands such that just compensation for property taken for 
navigation improvement must be the fair market value of the riparian property based on its 
access to navigable waters). 
 148. See, e.g., Horry Cnty. v. Tilghman, 322 S.E.2d 831, 834 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984) (“[E]ven if 
[private landowners] have some present interest in the submerged land, it nonetheless may be 
appropriated for public use (navigational purposes) by Horry County [a state governmental 
unit] without compensation.”). 
 149. 389 U.S. at 125. 
 150. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1684 (9th ed. 2009). 
 151. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (2001). 
 152. 82 Fed. Cl. 202 (2008). 
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It is important to again note the difference between water 
ownership and real property ownership; water is a usufructuary as 
opposed to a possessory right. Whereas real property ownership is 
defined by a right to exclude others from that property, water 
ownership is defined by the right to access and use that water.153 
If the state permits a private individual or entity to enjoy a state 
resource such as water, grazing, timber, minerals, or other public 
rights held in trust, ownership is not conferred, but instead the user 
should pay the public for this right to enjoy. The beneficiary of this 
right to use should compensate the public for the market value of the 
benefit since received,154 and in any event, the state should not be 
subject to a takings claim if it decides to withdraw the right to use. 
The right to use water owned by the public is analogous to the 
right to use other natural resources, such as the national forests for 
logging and public land for grazing155 and mining. Such a right to use 
may be considered a revocable license or permit.156 Logging 
companies are allowed to privately benefit by harvesting timber from 
public land, even though they have no real property interest.157 The 
Forest Service has lost money by offering private companies the right 
to cut down trees at a price that does not properly take into account 
the environmental and economic devastation which results.158 
Similarly, the Bureau of Reclamation experienced losses for water 
permits issued to private irrigators at prices far below the capital costs 
required to harness and transport water resources.159 Instead, the 
 
 153. Id. at 211. 
 154. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 605–06. 
 155. See Erin Morrow, The Environmental Front: Cultural Warfare in the West, 25 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 183, 199 (2005) (“The overall trend showed that protective state 
statutes mitigated the correlation between private land ownership and species decline, but 
grazing land showed the reverse trend.  Endangered species fared better on grazing lands in 
states without restrictive statutes than in states that had enacted land use restrictions.”); Sally K. 
Fairfax & Andrea Issod, Trust Principles as a Tool for Grazing Reform: Learning from Four 
State Cases, 33 ENVTL. L. 341, 341 (2003) (concluding that it is unlikely that trusts, auctions, or 
competitive leasing of grazing permits will work for federally owned lands and federal grazing 
reform will likely be politically difficult to accomplish). 
 156. See Laitos & Westfall, supra note 72, at 2 (“A private party may also acquire from the 
federal government the revocable right to use a public resource, often to the exclusion of others, 
in the form of a license or permit.”). 
 157. Dibadj, supra note 18, at 1059. 
 158. Id. at 1058–59. 
 159. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING 
WATER 133 (rev. ed. 1993) (discussing reclamation projects in the early 20th Century in the 
Rocky Mountains in which the cost of the projects was so high and the ability of private 
irrigators to pay for the water so low that “taxpayers would have to bail them out, even if bailing 
them out meant a long-term bill of billions and billions of dollars”). 
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government “gave” these public natural resources to private interests 
at a dear cost to the taxpayers.160 
The public trust doctrine may require the government to protect 
public assets and require a usage fee that is unsubsidized if a private 
actor wishes to use public resources.161 This problem of governmental 
“givings” also arises in the marketing of water rights since “[t]he 
initial allocation of entitlements is perhaps the most controversial 
aspect of a tradable permits system.”162 When water was abundant, it 
was distributed based upon first-in-time concepts.163 As we attempt to 
implement marketing of permits to promote efficient use of a limited 
resource, we need to decide whether the initial allocations will be free 
to those with existing uses or require payment to the state.164 In any 
event, the government should not be required to pay just 
compensation for a taking if it determines that the public trust 
doctrine requires it to revoke a grant of rights previously conferred.165 
The degree of protection given to a user of public resources 
depends upon how the “rights” are classified. Some rights, such as a 
fee interest in federal lands or a patent under the 1872 Mining Law, 
are considered vested property rights and are protected against 
deprivation by the government without just compensation.166 Non-
vested protectable property rights, such as oil and gas leases, mineral 
leases, and grazing permits, can be regulated, cannot be terminated 
unless done so pursuant to legislation in effect at the time the right 
was acquired, and may be protected “from the operation of 
subsequently passed law.”167 However, this protection from 
subsequent regulation may not be available if the lease is treated as a 
revocable license of resources that ultimately belong to the public, 
unless the lease contains contractual provisions with the state 
granting such protection. Interests can also be classified as protected 
 
 160. Dibadj, supra note 18, at 1059–60 (“The Forest Service has lost an astounding amount 
of taxpayer money: $6 billion between 1980 and 1991, and $1 billion from 1992 to 1994.”).  
Ironically, “[s]ome economists have argued that general federal timber management policies, by 
increasing cheap supply, actually hurt the very private companies they were supposed to 
benefit.”  Id. at 1091. 
 161. See id. at 1109–10. 
 162. Tietenberg, supra note 15, at 269–70. 
 163. See id. at 270. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See Dibadj, supra note 18, at 1110 (“[T]he sovereign has the right to revoke a grant 
conferred under the public trust.”). 
 166. Laitos & Westfall, supra note 72, at 9–13. 
 167. Id. at 14. 
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possessory interests, such as unpatented mining claims;168 non-
discretionary entitlements, such as noncompetitive coal leases, where 
the government does not have the right to reject an application and 
may be limited in withdrawing the entitlement at a later time;169 rights 
of possession, such as prospectors exploring a claim;170 or applications 
for the right to use public resources which are unprotected 
expectations.171 
Using federal public resource management as a potential model 
for water resource management, we see that public land management 
has typically centered on a philosophy of encouraging private 
development of federal resources. This is accomplished by granting 
private parties easements or partial title to public lands, while 
retaining “sufficient authority to protect federal interests.”172 The 
private rights conveyed are significant, but the nature of these rights 
differs depending upon whether they were obtained informally, how 
ecological interconnections are affected by the private and public 
ownership of specific parcels, and whether the resource involved is 
grazing land, timber, or a coal, oil, or gas lease. This model may not 
be appropriate for federal land management as it does not take into 
account the need to allow public participation in the decision-making 
process of federal agencies and managers.173 Our existing model of 
state or federal ownership of water rights174 also encourages resource 
development by using public water to irrigate private crops. Federal 
reclamation projects have funded capital investments to harness and 
transport water and have contractually issued water permits to retain 
authority over water use. However, proper management of this public 
resource now requires that water resources be left instream and not 
developed in order to meet environmental needs, just as grazing 
 
 168. Id. at 15 (noting that interests will be subject to substantial regulatory power). 
 169. Id. at 16–17. 
 170. Id. at 18 (stating that this right includes the “existing right to prevent third parties from 
interfering with the possessory interest”). 
 171. Id. at 18–19. 
 172. Sally K. Fairfax et al., The Federal Forests Are Not What They Seem: Formal and 
Informal Claims to Federal Lands, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 630, 635–36 (1999). 
 173. See id. at 646 (“[T]he Normal model is a poor reference point for understanding or 
redesigning allocation of decisionmaking on federal lands.”).  Professor Fairfax and her 
colleagues “carefully eschew[ed] any comment on the impact of private rights to water on the 
normal model of federal ownership.”  Id. at 636 n.18. 
 174. See id. at 636 n.18 (article authors stating that “we carefully eschew any comment on 
the impact of private rights to water on the normal model of federal ownership”). 
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leases and timber permits may need to be restricted to preserve the 
ecological integrity of public lands. 
Determining property rights in natural resources other than 
water is problematic because federal land management policies must 
balance public and private interests in these resources, and these 
policies differ depending upon the resource being managed.175 
National parks are generally managed to preserve resources in a 
natural state for the public, public grazing lands are dedicated to 
commercial uses, and national forests serve multiple uses, including 
oil, mineral, and timber harvesting, ranching, and recreation.176 
Valuing and allocating these public resources depends upon how 
property rights are defined, and defining these rights depends upon 
how we strike the balance between public ownership and private 
interests in our public resources.177 The federal government has 
retained title to these public assets while enticing the private sector to 
develop these resources by providing sufficient certainty in private 
rights to encourage capital investment.178 However, both 
environmental and economic concerns about the adverse impacts this 
development has had on our public resources required the 
government to reexamine costly federal subsidies and adopt 
appropriate resource management reform.179 
Federal grazing rights litigation illustrates the battle between 
landowners arguing for protectable property rights in public resources 
against environmentalist claims that such rights to use public 
resources are revocable licenses not subject to a takings claim upon 
revocation.180 In Colvin Cattle Co. v. United States,181 the Federal 
 
 175. Daniel S. Levy & David Friedman, The Revenge of the Redwoods? Reconsidering 
Property Rights and the Economic Allocation of Natural Resources, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 521–
22 (1994). 
 176. Id. at 522 (noting that the public cannot restrict this exploitation without paying 
compensation). 
 177. Id. at 525–26 (“In environmental law, the need to define property rights in legal 
disputes may necessitate a political solution.”); see also Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: 
The Capture of Grass, Ground, and Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 725 (2005) (“[W]estern 
livestock grazing is endangering species and disrupting ecosystem processes on landscape scales 
at unprecedented rates.”). 
 178. See Keiter, supra note 18, at 1156–57 (referring to “such enticements as secure tenure 
and below-cost market pricing”). 
 179. See id. at 1157–58. 
 180. See Abelson, supra note 13, at 413 (“[T]he case law and statutory framework support 
the conclusion that grazing permits are revocable licenses which do not constitute vested 
property rights and are thus not subject to compensation upon revocation.”). 
 181. 468 F.3d 803 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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Circuit clearly stated that grazing on federal public lands “was [before 
the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act], and remains, a privilege, not a right.”182 
The cattle ranch lost value by losing a grazing lease on adjacent public 
land, and its water rights to beneficially water livestock became 
worthless without the associated ability to graze.183 However, the 
court concluded that no taking of property had occurred since 
“grazing is not a stick in the bundle of rights that [the cattle ranch] 
has ever acquired.”184 Following the Colvin Cattle decision, the Court 
of Federal Claims in Hage V reiterated that a grazing permit on 
federal land was a revocable license, not a property right.185 
Nevertheless, these public land grazing entitlements create 
expectations about property and are factored into a ranch’s value 
such that abolishing low-fee grazing permits will create uncertainty 
about property values and undermine the economic role played by 
secure property ownership.186 
A water right is a usufructuary right, and although it entitles the 
holder of the right to “a vested interest in that right, the right itself is 
something less than the full ownership of property because it is a right 
not to the corpus of the water but to the use of the water.”187 The very 
 
 182. Id. at 807 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. at 808. 
 184. Id.; see also Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray, 173 P.3d 749, 755 (2007) (noting that water 
rights are distinct from land ownership such that there is no grazing right implicit in a water 
right for stock watering; that water rights are not implicit in mining claims; and that land and 
water rights are “separate unless bound together by express agreement”). 
 185. Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 209 (2008) (refusing to compensate 
owners for value of cattle impounded for trespass on federal land); see also United States v. 
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 494 (1973) (holding that revocable grazing permits created no property 
rights); Acton v. United States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that holders of 
revocable uranium prospecting permits had no right which persisted beyond taking and were 
not entitled to compensation when the United States cancelled the permits); White Sands 
Ranchers of N.M. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 559, 568 (1988) (refusing to compensate ranchers 
for value of grazing permits because ranchers had “no enforceable property rights in the public 
domain”); Leshy, supra note 12, at 2023–24 (“There is an active market in permits to graze 
livestock on federal land, for example, even though federal law is absolutely clear that such 
permits carry with them no property right.”). 
 186. See Rose, supra note 1, at 343–44 (observing that if low cost grazing permits are 
discontinued, the property value of ranches will be diminished, thus “undermining the security 
of people's expectations about their property” which will “undercut property's all-important 
economic role—that is, making owners feel secure”). 
 187. Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315–16 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (holding the 
valuable nature of the privilege to graze, which would ultimately ripen into a permit under the 
Act, was subject to equitable protection against an illegal act); see also Zellmer & Harder, supra 
note 4, at 697 (“[A] water right does not constitute ownership of the water itself; it is instead 
usufructuary, or ‘a right to use water.’”). 
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nature of this public communal resource obligates the sovereign to 
protect the resource under the public trust.188 Like a grazing right, or 
the right to cut timber on federal public land, the right to use water 
should be treated as a revocable license. Such a license will be subject 
to due process challenges when revoked, but it should not support a 
takings claim as there is no private property interest in public 
resources, which are owned by the state in trust for the people.189 
Contract Rights 
Water rights may also be protected based on contract principles, 
without the need to view the rights as property.190 These contractual 
rights can be based upon state or federal contracts. The federal 
Bureau of Reclamation agrees to deliver water from dams and 
reservoirs in the western states to municipalities and irrigation 
districts.191 In recent years, these contracts have come into conflict 
with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) as the habitats of threatened 
or endangered species have been jeopardized by contractual water 
deliveries. Reductions in these water deliveries to satisfy ESA 
obligations have generated litigation asserting both contract claims 
and takings claims under the Fifth Amendment.192 Some courts have 
held that irrigators under contract to receive water have property 
rights,193 and some commentators believe that in most circumstances, 
“municipalities and irrigation districts or district members do have 
property rights under state law.”194 However, these property rights are 
based on contract and, “although a contract right is property under 
 
 188. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 693 (discussing the Roman, English, and early 
American law recognition of the public trust over water and the universal regard for this public 
resource). 
 189. See id. at 711 (arguing that revocable licenses, such as grazing permits, are not “takings 
property,” but may constitute “due process property”).  But see Grant, supra note 62, at 1364 
(“[A] usufruct is an incorporeal interest, that is, an intangible.  This does not mean, however, 
that a water right cannot be the subject of a physical taking.”). 
 190. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 62, at 1331 (stating that this “article shows that water users 
supplied under Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) contracts often will have Fifth Amendment 
property rights”). 
 191. Id. at 1333. 
 192. Id. at 1333–35. 
 193. See id. at 1346–51 (discussing Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937), Nevada v. United States, 
463 U.S. 110 (1983), and Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), as “support[ing] the 
proposition that if operative state laws regarding the relationship between a water supplier and 
the irrigators it supplies vest property rights in the irrigators to continuance of their supply, the 
Bureau in its capacity as a water supply entity must proceed in conformity with those property 
rights”). 
 194. See id. at 1335. 
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the Takings Clause, no governmental taking of the other party’s 
property occurs if the party retains the range of remedies associated 
with vindication of a contract,” even if there is ultimately no breach 
found.195 
If property ownership of water resides in the state, rights to the 
use of water can nevertheless be transferred by the state via permit 
and subsequent state delivery contracts to end users.196 In a dispute 
involving water use restrictions imposed by the federal government 
against California water users, the Court of Federal Claims in Tulare 
Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States197 concluded that 
the “right to the use of water is a compensable contractual right”198 
and that such a “right to divert water in the manner specified by their 
contracts . . . continued until a determination to the contrary was 
made either by the [State Water Resources Control Board] or by the 
California courts.”199 The Tulare court clearly recognized that the 
water users’ contract rights “are subject to the doctrines of reasonable 
use and public trust and to the tenets of state nuisance law.”200 
However, unless the state acts to balance the interests under 
California law as to the cost and benefit of species preservation, the 
federal government must compensate the users for any water it uses 
to satisfy the objectives of the ESA.201 Thus, “[t]he state water 
contracts . . . protected the state but not the federal government 
against liability for shortages from drought or other causes,”202 such as 
the legislative demand for species preservation. 
In Klamath Irrigation District,203 the Court of Federal Claims 
affirmed that contract claims based upon rights arising from a federal 
contract with the United States government are protected under the 
Fifth Amendment; however, the court also warned that takings 
 
 195. Id. at 1355–56; see also Davenport & Bell, supra note 40, at 4 (“Contractual water rights 
are difficult to characterize as a defensible property interest because contractual contingencies 
may reduce the certainty of the right.”). 
 196. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (2001) 
(“While under California law the title to water always remains with the state, the right to the 
water’s use is transferred first by permit to DWR, and then by contract to end-users, such as the 
plaintiffs.”) (footnote omitted). 
 197. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). 
 198. Id. at 318 n.6. 
 199. Id. at 324. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. (“The federal government is certainly free to preserve the fish; it must simply 
pay for the water it takes to do so.”). 
 202. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 8, at 316. 
 203. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504 (2005). 
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compensation should not be commingled with contract damages.204 
The court concluded that the irrigators seeking compensation from 
the United States because of temporary reductions in water supply by 
the Bureau of Reclamation were third-party beneficiaries of the 
district contracts and thus their claims “sound[ed] in contract, not in 
takings.”205 Recognizing the claimants’ understandable expectation of 
uninterrupted water flow for irrigation, the court explained that such 
expectation does not give them property rights greater than what they 
obtained and possessed.206 Instead, “water rights, though undeniably 
precious, are subject to the same rules that govern all forms of 
property—they enjoy no elevated or more protected status,” and in 
this case such rights were in the form of contract claims.207 
The availability of contract remedies may preclude a takings 
claim that is based upon an alleged breach of contract. However, a 
physical diversion of water to build a fish ladder, as opposed to a 
requirement that water be left instream, may support a takings 
challenge in addition to contract claims.208 When the federal 
government physically diverted water and reduced the amount of 
water a California municipal water district was entitled to receive 
under a California water rights license, the Federal Circuit held in 
Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States209 that the diversion 
to build a fish ladder was a physical taking.210 It allowed Casitas to 
assert contract claims in addition to its takings claim, but concluded 
that the federal government was not liable for breaching its contract 
obligations with the district by failing to make all of the water in Lake 
Casitas and the water impounded behind the Robles Dam available 
to the district as part of the Ventura River Project agreement.211 
State or federal contracts establish protectable water rights, but 
contract provisions may also limit the government’s obligation to 
provide the promised water supply when reductions are required 
 
 204. Id. at 531 (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934), and Hughes 
Commc’ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1060, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
 205. Id. at 534–35. 
 206. Id. at 540. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“The government requirement that Casitas build the fish ladder and divert water to it should 
be analyzed under the physical takings rubric.”). 
 209. 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 210. Id. at 1296 (reversing district court’s finding that a taking under the Fifth Amendment 
did not occur). 
 211. Id. at 1286–88. 
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under the ESA to protect endangered species.212 Discretionary action 
by the government in renegotiating or renewing water supply 
contracts will be subject to compliance with the ESA, and “contracts, 
including those to which the federal government is a party, are subject 
to subsequently enacted legislation.”213 The Ninth Circuit, in O’Neill 
v. United States,214 concluded that contract language limiting liability 
for water shortages because of “any other causes” included the 
government’s water supply reduction to comply with the legislative 
mandates of the ESA.215 When water users’ rights are established 
based upon the terms of a contract with the government, the fluid 
nature of property rights in water will not impact the litigation 
outcome of water rights disputes.216 Instead, in most cases contract 
remedies and defenses will be operative in lieu of takings claims, 
which require the existence of a property right.217 
 
III. GROUNDWATER RIGHTS 
Private property rights in surface water are fluid and may confer 
only a usufructuary right to use, with the state or federal government 
retaining title and ownership under the public trust doctrine. But 
certainly private landowners own the groundwater or any natural 
storage structures located beneath their surface rights. Or do they? 
After all, the ancient property maxim cujus est solum, ejus est usque 
ad coelum et ad inferos dictates that “[t]he owner of the soil owns to 
the Heavens and also the lowest depths.”218 However, groundwater 
rights are “fragile and limited, because you cannot stop others from 
 
 212. Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 8, at 313–14 (quoting a memorandum by the Regional 
Solicitor’s Office of the Department of Interior, which stated that contractual obligations to 
deliver water were subject to the availability of water and that water would not be available if 
delivery was not made due to a need to comply with federal laws, such as the ESA). 
 213. Parobek, supra note 11, at 195 (discussing Barcellos & Wolfsen v. Westlands Water 
Dist., 849 F. Supp. 717 (E.D. Cal. 1993), which “held that the water service agreement between 
the Bureau, as the supplier of water, and the local irrigation district, did not confer any absolute 
contract right to unqualified delivery of irrigation water”). 
 214. 50 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 215. Id. at 682–84. 
 216. See Davenport & Bell, supra note 40, at 43 (discussing the Ickes v. Fox case holding 
that “because the water users complied with their contractual obligations and put their water to 
beneficial use, their right to use project water vested under Washington state law”). 
 217. See Gray, supra note 32, at 17 (noting that if there is no breach of contract there is no 
liability and “it is unnecessary for the court to engage in the complex investigation into the 
nature of water rights”). 
 218. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 102 (1916). 
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pumping groundwater out from underneath your land, so long as they 
withdraw it from wells on their own land and use it on that land.”219 
Groundwater pumping can also adversely affect surface water uses, 
and a surface water user may not have a right to exclude groundwater 
pumpers from removing water.220 If a landowner of the surface soil 
claims a property right in groundwater, such a claim is without 
meaning if there is “no right to prevent anyone else from 
withdrawing, using, and exhausting it.”221 
It appears that in many jurisdictions, there is no right to 
groundwater based upon land ownership over an underground 
source, and “[g]round water, like surface water, must be appropriated 
and applied to beneficial use before a vested water right will result.”222 
In several cases involving groundwater issues, courts have applied 
surface water principles to groundwater and eschewed any distinction 
between these different sources.223 In Cappaert v. United States,224 for 
example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the federal 
reserved rights doctrine “the United States can protect its water from 
subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or 
groundwater,”225 and in Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub,226 the Nebraska 
Supreme Court found that there is no private property interest in 
either surface or groundwater since “water is viewed as a public want 
and the appropriation is a right to use the water.”227 Furthermore, it 
appears that those jurisdictions applying the public trust doctrine to 
 
 219. Leshy, supra note 12, at 1988. 
 220. Id. at 1989. 
 221. Id. at 2004–05; see also Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 695 (noting that the doctrine 
of “absolute ownership” of ground water is a misnomer because “[a]s soon as someone with a 
more powerful pump comes along, existing uses of the aquifer can be diminished or completely 
eviscerated, with no legal recourse”). 
 222. Hydro Res. Corp. v. Gray, 173 P.3d 749, 756 (N.M. 2007). 
 223. See, e.g., Hood ex rel. Miss. v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 630–31 (5th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010) (making no distinction between the underground aquifer at 
issue and “other interstate water resources”); Davis v. Agua Sierra Res., 203 P.3d 506, 510 
(Ariz. 2009) (stating that Arizona law does not recognize a property interest in groundwater 
unless it has “been captured and applied to reasonable use”); Town of Chino Valley v. State 
Land Dep’t, 580 P.2d 704, 709 (Ariz. 1978) (“Under the doctrine of reasonable use property 
owners have the right to capture and use the underground water beneath their land for a 
beneficial purpose on that land . . . .”). 
 224. 426 U.S. 128 (1976). 
 225. Id. at 143. 
 226. 691 N.W.2d 116 (Neb. 2005). 
 227. Id. at 127 (holding that no claim for trespass or conversion is possible since there is no 
property interest in water, only a right to use). 
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surface water will similarly apply this doctrine to prevent private 
property interests in groundwater.228 
Five Common Law Groundwater Doctrines 
While there are essentially three possible surface water doctrines 
in existence in the United States—riparian, prior appropriation, and a 
hybrid of the two—there are five different common law groundwater 
doctrines adopted by states, separate and apart from the surface 
water laws.229 Many states statutorily alter these doctrines, and both 
the common law doctrines and statutory regulation may vary based 
upon the geographic area and whether the water is percolating 
groundwater or an underground stream.230 These state regulations are 
sometimes adopted to address a specific geographic area in order to 
conserve groundwater and prevent overdrafts, or they may be 
directed at regulating well drilling.231 One of the persistent problems 
with state water resource management is “[t]he failure of states to 
regulate ground and surface water as a unified resource.”232 
In his article discussing the public trust doctrine as applied to 
groundwater, Professor Jack Tuholske gives a brief overview of 
groundwater law and describes the five common law doctrines.233 The 
absolute dominion rule is recognized by five states and is based on the 
rule of capture, allowing the “overlying landowner to take as much 
groundwater as the landowner desires, without limitation or liability 
to adjoining landowners.”234 The more widely used reasonable use rule 
requires courts to balance competing uses and allow unlimited 
withdrawal, unless such withdrawal causes unreasonable harm to 
 
 228. See, e.g., Mulvaney, supra note 8, at 370 (discussing In re Water Use Permit 
Applications (Wai’ahole I), 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000), where “the Hawai’i Supreme Court 
rejected a takings challenge concerning the exercise of public trust rights over groundwater, 
holding that the state assumed the duty to protect those lands and waters long before the 
formation of individual property rights, and private interests cannot claim a vested right to 
them”). 
 229. See Tuholske, supra note 98, at 204–05. 
 230. Id. at 205. 
 231. Id. at 211–12. 
 232. Id. at 212–13 (noting that groundwater is “the source of almost 40% of the stream flow 
in the United States”); see also Spear T Ranch, 691 N.W.2d at 125 (“Nebraska water law ignores 
the hydrological fact that ground water and surface water are inextricably linked.”). 
 233. Tuholske, supra note 98, at 205–11. 
 234. Id. at 205–06 (citing JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, QUANTITATIVE GROUNDWATER LAW, 
in 3 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 20.07, at 20-36 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991 ed., 2003 repl. 
vol.)). 
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other aquifer users.235 The California correlative rights rule allows 
courts to apportion competing uses in proportion to the surface 
ownership interests whenever an aquifer cannot sustain unlimited 
withdrawal from all users.236 Prior appropriation rules are not as easy 
to apply to groundwater as they are to surface water, but rights to 
groundwater can be obtained under this doctrine by putting the water 
to beneficial use, thereby assuring that junior users cannot interfere 
with senior rights.237 The fifth doctrine relies on tort law to regulate 
the use of groundwater based on liability for withdrawing water in a 
manner that harms others.238 
Arizona is a good example of a state that uses one doctrine to 
govern surface water and another to govern groundwater, even 
though it does not distinguish between the two sources for purposes 
of determining whether water is property.239 Under Arizona law, 
surface water is subject to the prior appropriation doctrine, while 
groundwater is governed by the doctrine of reasonable use by the 
overlying landowner.240 Arizona’s common law originally viewed 
groundwater as the property of the overlying landowner but later 
judicially limited this right such that “land ownership does not include 
ownership of the groundwater itself, but instead may afford a 
qualified right to extract and use the groundwater for the benefit of 
the land.”241 The Groundwater Management Act (GMA), established 
by Arizona’s legislature in 1980, later created a statutory “system of 
groundwater rights and conservation.”242 At issue in Davis v. Agua 
Sierra Resources243 was whether a landowner had a property interest 
 
 235. Id. at 207. 
 236. Id. at 209 (noting that this doctrine is not conservation-based since “[s]urface owners 
are free to use all of an aquifer, as long as they do not damage another in the process”). 
 237. Id. at 209–10 (noting that problems are encountered because groundwater may not be 
renewable and so senior rights become valueless and the interconnectedness of surface and 
groundwater may impact appropriation seniority of both types of water resources). 
 238. Id. at 210–11. 
 239. See Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen, 207 P.3d 654, 660 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) 
(noting that the source of the water, whether surface or ground, “does not change the 
usufructuary nature of a water right”). 
 240. Davis v. Agua Sierra Res., 203 P.3d 506, 508 (Ariz. 2009). 
 241. Id. (citing Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott (Chino Valley II), 638 P.2d 1324, 
1328 (Ariz. 1981)). 
 242. Id. at 509 (citing 1980 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 1, § 86 (4th Spec. Sess.) (codified as 
amended at ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-401 to -704 (2003 & Supp. 2008)). 
 243. 203 P.3d 506 (Ariz. 2009). 
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in the potential future use of groundwater.244 The Davis court 
reviewed earlier Arizona decisions and the GMA to conclude that 
“‘there is no right of ownership of groundwater in Arizona prior to its 
capture and withdrawal from the common supply and that the right of 
the owner of the overlying land is simply to the usufruct of the 
water.’”245 Therefore, the court determined the potential future use of 
groundwater that has not yet been captured or applied is an 
“unvested expectancy”246 and held that landowners do not have a real 
property right to this potential future use.247 
Arizona illustrates the confusion over the property status of 
water rights that exists in many states. The Davis decision, discussed 
above, appears to unequivocally denounce the existence of a property 
interest in water that has not been captured or applied, yet in 
Strawberry Water Co. v. Paulsen,248 the state appellate court 
announced that “[w]ater rights are real property interests.”249 
However, when the court in Strawberry Water Co. distinguished rights 
to groundwater from rights to already pumped groundwater, it 
concluded that the right to groundwater is a right to use, not a right to 
own, and that groundwater is transformed into personal property only 
when it is “captured” by being reduced to possession and control 
within pipes.250 Thus, within one opinion, we see the fluid nature of 
this property right changing from real property, to no property, to 
personal property. It should also be noted that if water rights are 
viewed as personal property and not real property, they may receive 
even less protection based on this distinction.251 
Property rights in groundwater have also evolved, or one might 
say “disappeared,” in Hawaii. Originally recognizing the absolute 
ownership rule as applied to groundwater, Hawaii abandoned this 
 
 244. See id. at 509 (noting Agua Sierra’s claim that “the right to prospectively use 
groundwater is one of the ‘sticks’ in the bundle of a landowner’s property rights, and the 
landowner can reserve this stick when conveying the surface estate to another”). 
 245. Id. at 510 (quoting Chino Valley II, 638 P.2d at 1328). 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 512. 
 248. 207 P.3d 654 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 249. Id. at 659 (holding that water rights cannot be converted since they are real property 
rights, not chattels) (citing Paloma Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Jenkins, 978 P.2d 110, 115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1998)). 
 250. Id. at 660 & n.4 (“The source [surface or ground] of the water in question does not 
change the usufructuary nature of a water right.”). 
 251. See Leshy, supra note 12, at 2013 (noting that Justice Scalia in the Lucas decision 
“contrasted land with personal property, regarding the latter as having, generally speaking, 
much less constitutional protection against governmental regulation”). 
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doctrine in City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Commission,252 
and adopted a correlative rights approach which allowed the 
landowner to use as much groundwater as needed unless the 
withdrawal interfered with the relative rights of other surface 
landowners.253 This established a co-ownership property right in the 
surface landowners overlying the groundwater.254 These property 
rights seemingly “disappeared” when the Hawaii Supreme Court in 
In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai’ahole Ditch)255 determined 
that groundwater rights did not pass with the private ownership of the 
surface land but were instead reserved in the state under the public 
trust doctrine, which applied to all water resources.256 While some 
argue that applying the public trust doctrine to groundwater 
eliminates private property rights and requires just compensation 
under the Fifth Amendment,257 others argue that no distinction 
between surface water and groundwater should apply and that “[t]he 
better view is that water is a common resource, held in trust by the 
State for the wise and perpetual use by its citizens.”258 
Limitations on Groundwater Rights 
Even when states appear to recognize property rights in 
groundwater, these rights may be limited. In Texas, for example, the 
legislature “has recognized that land owners have property rights in 
the groundwater located beneath their land,” but it has allowed these 
rights to be limited by groundwater conservation districts.259 Under 
Texas water law, a Groundwater Conservation District (GCD) may 
 
 252. City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm’n, 30 Haw. 912 (1929), overruled by 
In re Water Use Permit Applications (Wai’ahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409 (2000). 
 253. Callies & Chipchase, supra note 27, at 65. 
 254. Id. 
 255. 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000). 
 256. Callies & Chipchase, supra note 27, at 69; see also id. at 71 (noting that expanding the 
public trust doctrine “required the court to eliminate correlative rights”); id. at 74 (asserting that 
the court’s elimination of water rights was an “unconstitutional taking of property”). 
 257. See id. at 71–74; Tuholske, supra note 98, at 235 (“Recent attempts in Vermont to apply 
the public trust doctrine to groundwater through legislation were opposed by property rights 
advocates, the ski industry, and water bottlers.”). 
 258. Tuholske, supra note 98, at 236; see also In re Metro. Utils. Dist. of Omaha, 140 N.W.2d 
626, 636 (Neb. 1966) (“Underground waters, whether they be percolating waters or 
underground streams, are a part of the waters referred to in the Constitution as a natural want.  
Such waters are as much a part of the hydrologic cycle as the flow of water in a stream or 
river.”). 
 259. Coates v. Hall, 512 F. Supp. 2d 770, 778 (W.D. Tex. 2007) (citing TEX. WATER CODE 
ANN. § 36.002 (2005)). 
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regulate the amount of groundwater withdrawn, the recharging of 
groundwater, the spacing and permitting of wells, and “may exercise 
the power of eminent domain to acquire by condemnation a fee 
simple or other interest in property, [but] it may not exercise this 
power to acquire rights to groundwater, surface water, or water 
rights.”260 In deciding whether a takings claim was ripe based upon the 
finality element from Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank,261 a Texas district court in Coates v. 
Hall262 disagreed with an earlier Texas district court decision, which 
held that “an inverse condemnation claim is not available in Texas to 
recover money damages for an alleged groundwater taking.”263 
The Coates court accepted that a GCD could not “take” property 
rights in groundwater through eminent domain, but it noted that 
regulatory takings are not specifically addressed in the Texas Water 
Code section, which forbids eminent domain actions, and it pointed to 
a Texas Supreme Court case that allowed an inverse condemnation 
action for regulatory takings.264 Nevertheless, the Coates court 
concluded that Texas state law was unclear as to whether the finality 
element of the groundwater takings claim had been met.265 Although 
the Texas Supreme Court in Barshop v. Medina County Underground 
Water Conservation District266 had assumed that landowners in Texas 
have a property right in water beneath their land, it did not decide 
that such a property interest exists, and the Texas district court in 
Coates similarly declined to decide whether a property interest in 
Texas groundwater exists.267 
The public trust doctrine has been used to restrict property rights 
in surface water, but its use has been limited in some states to 
navigable and tidal waters.268 However, some courts expanded this 
doctrine to protect other natural resources and environmental 
 
 260. Id. at 778–79 (citing TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.105 (2005)). 
 261. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
 262. 512 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 263. Id. at 786 (disagreeing with Williamson v. Guadalupe Cnty. Groundwater Conservation 
Dist., 343 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598–99 (W.D. Tex. 2004)). 
 264. Id. at 786 n.8 (citing Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. 1992)). 
 265. Id. at 785. 
 266. 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996). 
 267. See Coates, 512 F. Supp. 2d at 785–86 (quoting Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 630–31). 
 268. Tuholske, supra note 98, at 215–16 (discussing the historical principles recognized in 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois in 1892, which extended the public trust doctrine to 
navigable waters). 
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interests, due to their importance to the public as a whole.269 As 
mentioned above, the Hawaii Supreme Court extended the public 
trust doctrine to groundwater in In re Water Use Permit Applications 
(Wai’ahole Ditch).270 New Hampshire statutorily extended the 
doctrine to groundwater in 2004, as did Connecticut in its state 
environmental protection act of 1988.271 If the public trust doctrine is 
extended beyond protecting navigability to protecting public water 
resources, groundwater should be protected to the same degree the 
doctrine protects surface water as these public water resources are 
inevitably connected.272 
Ownership of the Aquifer Structure 
Another controversial ownership issue relates to aquifer 
structures, which are potentially valuable assets when used for storing 
groundwater for later use. This issue arose between the states of 
Tennessee and Mississippi, when Mississippi sued Tennessee for a 
wrongful appropriation of groundwater contained within an aquifer 
located beneath Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas.273 In Hood v. 
City of Memphis, the Fifth Circuit upheld the lower court decision 
that Tennessee was an indispensable party274 because the court 
concluded that the aquifer was an interstate resource and that the 
doctrine of equitable apportionment should be applied to resolve an 
interstate dispute as to water use entitlements.275 The court did not 
distinguish between surface water and groundwater in applying the 
doctrine of equitable apportionment and rejected the argument that 
apportioning a shared water source was dependent upon state 
boundaries.276 
 
 269. See id. at 216–18 (observing the important influence of Joseph Sax and his famous 
article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention). 
 270. 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000) (“[T]he public trust doctrine applies to all water resources 
without exception or distinction.”). 
 271. See Tuholske, supra note 98, at 220 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481:1 (2004); 
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-16 (1988)). 
 272. Id. at 222–23 (“It is time to recognize that the public trust doctrine embraces the water 
itself.  Groundwater . . . is inexorably tied to surface water.”). 
 273. Hood ex rel. Miss. v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010). 
 274. Id. at 631. 
 275. Id. at 629–30. 
 276. Id. at 630 (“The fact that this particular water source is located underground, as 
opposed to resting above ground as a lake, is of no analytical significance.”). 
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With regards to the right to store water in underground storage 
basins, courts in both California277 and Nebraska278 do not protect the 
ownership of authorized extractors or overlying landowners, 
respectively. In Central & West Basin Water Replenishment District v. 
Southern California Water Co.,279 the California Court of Appeal held 
that because the amendment to the California Constitution 
mandating the use of all water resources in a manner consistent with 
the people’s interest applies to “the use of all of the water within the 
state,” the right to use subsurface storage space is also a public 
resource.280 Because the subsurface storage space is a public resource, 
utilizing underground storage space would be subject to the beneficial 
use requirement of the California Constitution.281 Although some 
commentators consider California law to be unsettled in this area,282 at 
least one commentator believes that California courts have 
established “underground storage rights as a limitation on overlying 
private property rights.”283 This limitation arises by applying the 
correlative rights doctrine to find that a water district owns 
groundwater in trust for the overlying surface owners located within 
the district.284 
 
 277. See Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal. Water Co., 109 Cal. App. 
4th 891, 917 (2003) (“[A]ppellants’ right to extract water from the Central Basin does not create 
a concomitant right to store water in the Central Basin.”). 
 278. See Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist. v. Abrahamson, 413 N.W.2d 290, 298 
(Neb. 1987) (disagreeing with the appellants’ contention “that the right to use the ground water 
gives rise to the exclusive right to use the storage space”). 
 279. 109 Cal. App. 4th at 891. 
 280. Id. at 904–05 (interpreting CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2) (“[T]he parties’ statement that the 
subsurface storage space is a public resource is amply supported by the Constitution and Water 
Code.”). 
 281. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (requiring that “the water resources of the State be put to 
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable”). 
 282. See, e.g., Kevin M. O’Brien, The Governor’s Commissions Recommendations on 
Groundwater: Treading Water Until the Next Drought, 36 MCGEORGE L. REV. 435, 442 (2005) 
(noting a “need for clear rules defining ownership rights” and discussing unresolved issues). 
 283. See Victor E. Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 625, 649–50 
(1976) (discussing Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. Alameda Cnty. Water Dist., 37 Cal. App. 3d 924 
(Ct. App. 1974)). 
 284. Niles Sand & Gravel Co., 37 Cal. App. 3d at 929 n.5 (applying correlative rights 
doctrine); see also Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 136 (1903) (changing the common law rule 
that percolating water belongs to the overlying surface owner to recognize the correlative rights 
doctrine, which provides that “[d]isputes between overlying landowners, concerning water for 
use on the land, to which they have an equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for 
all, are to be settled by giving to each a fair and just proportion”). 
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In Central Nebraska Public Power & Irrigation District v. 
Abrahamson,285 the Nebraska Supreme Court similarly limited the 
private rights of overlying landowners to underground water storage 
by holding that a state statute recognizing incidental underground 
water storage associated with a proper appropriation was 
constitutional.286 This statute was challenged as a possible taking of 
private property without just compensation because it permitted 
individuals or entities, other than the overlying property owners, to 
use the storage associated with water appropriation.287 The court 
dismissed the takings claim, finding that the statute was not 
unconstitutional and did not interfere with appellants’ right to use 
their property.288 Thus, in some jurisdictions, contrary to the 
reasonable expectation of property rights in what lies below the 
surface, overlying landowners may not have a property right to either 
the groundwater or the natural storage structures beneath their 
surface property. 
IV. RAINWATER RIGHTS 
While many people would be surprised to learn that “collect[ing] 
rainwater that falls on your roof or in your yard” might be illegal,289 
several states have identified rainwater as part of their state water law 
regime.290 It is unclear whether these states are using the public trust 
doctrine to assert state control,291 but because rainwater is naturally 
 
 285. 413 N.W.2d 290 (Neb. 1987). 
 286. Id. at 299 (finding that the statute is not in conflict with any provision in the Nebraska 
Constitution). 
 287. Id. at 297. 
 288. See id. at 299 (“Appellants’ rights in the use of the ‘ground water’ . . . under their lands 
are not affected.”). 
 289. See, e.g., Connie Coyne, Editorial, Our Agenda: Provide Facts, Perspective, SALT LAKE 
TRIB., Feb. 6, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 2448820 (discussing Utah’s requirement that one 
obtain a water right to collect rain water). 
 290. See, e.g., Patty Henetz, Free as the Rain? Don’t Bet on it; Collecting Wet Bounty May Be 
Illegal, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 22, 2008, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
SLTR000020081022e4am0006m (noting that Utah considers as public property “all water in the 
state—above, below or on the ground”); John Dodge, Big Money, Big Goal: $220 Million 
Infusion to Aid in Cleanup, OLYMPIAN, Feb. 18, 2008, at A2 (discussing efforts in Washington 
state to “make it easier for homes, businesses and office buildings to collect rainwater from 
rooftops without running afoul of state water rights laws”). 
 291. For additional thoughts on the public trust doctrine and rainwater, see Kenton M. 
Bednarz, Should the Public Trust Doctrine Interplay with the Bottling of Michigan 
Groundwater? Now Is the Appropriate Time for the Michigan Supreme Court to Decide, 53 
WAYNE L. REV. 733, 747–48 (2007) (noting that, similarly to groundwater, rainwater is included 
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interconnected to surface water and groundwater, these states 
consider rainwater diversion away from the natural process of 
precipitation reaching surface or groundwater to be an interference 
with existing water rights.292 Washington State, for example, considers 
rainwater to be a state water resource and prohibits a certain 
magnitude of rainwater collection without an appropriate water right 
permit.293 The state is interested in “‘ensur[ing] that collection and 
storage of rainwater happens in a way that is consistent with 
protecting stream flows and water rights.’”294 However, the state also 
recognizes that it is important to facilitate rainwater collection in 
urban areas to supplement municipal water supplies and reduce storm 
water runoff.295 
Historically in Texas, rainwater collection was a common method 
of supplying water to homes, ranches, and farms.296 As with other arid 
western states, increased water demands in Texas limited existing 
municipal supplies obtained from pumping surface and groundwater 
to individual landowners.297 In addition to its importance as a 
supplement to local water supplies, rainwater is hailed by some as 
better-tasting drinking water, and as advantageous for appliances and 
 
within the public trust doctrine because of its connectivity to surface water, but the public’s right 
to it does not vest “until it ends up in a body of public trust encompassed surface water”). 
 292. See Patty Henetz, supra note 290 (observing that if homeowners in Utah were allowed 
to collect rainwater without a water law right, such a diversion would be improper if no new 
water allocations were being granted and farmers would complain that “[a]llowing city folk to 
harvest rainwater without a water right would be like letting them move into an apartment 
without paying rent”); State Has Obligation to Manage Resources, THE OLYMPIAN, Aug. 23, 
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 15948336 (noting that in Washington there is a concern that 
“large-scale rainwater collection could reduce the water supply of folks holding ‘senior’ water 
rights, obtained under the state’s doctrine of ‘first in time, first in use’”). 
 293. Rainwater Collection Rule to be Discussed at Aberdeen Open House, WASH. DEPT. OF 
ECOLOGY (July 10, 2008), http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2008news/2008-191.html (reporting that 
the state Department of Ecology is drafting new regulations to “define how much rainwater can 
be collected and used before a permit is required”); see also JAY J. MANNING, DEP’T OF 
ECOLOGY, POL 1017, WATER RESOURCES PROGRAM POLICY REGARDING COLLECTION OF 
RAINWATER FOR BENEFICIAL USE 1, available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/programs/wr/rules/ 
images/pdf/pol1017.pdf. 
 294. Rainwater Collection Rule, supra note 293 (quoting Brian Walsh, the Washington 
Department of Ecology’s policy and planning manager for water resources). 
 295. Id. (noting that in some areas, such as the San Juan Islands, rain water is the only 
source of water for some landowners). 
 296. Patrick Driscoll, Rainfall Is Airborne Aquifer: Rainwater Harvesting Reaps Benefit, SAN 
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 2, 1998, at 01H. 
 297. Id. 
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plants as the salt and mineral content is reduced.298 Rain collection 
systems may sometimes be more cost-effective than drilling a well, 
but they may require screening and filtering and should not be used 
for drinking water if they collect from roofs and gutters that may 
contain toxic chemicals such as lead or asbestos.299 Nevertheless, 
Texas encourages rainwater harvesting as a water conservation 
measure, and it does not regulate rainwater collection.300 
Colorado is forward-looking in its approach to rainwater 
harvesting and views this potential water source as a way to make up 
for groundwater loss in the state.301 The state is considering a proposal 
to construct ten experimental groundwater collection facilities.302 To 
ensure that downstream stakeholders are not adversely impacted by 
this collection experiment, the program would “monitor how much 
water is collected and . . . then supply an equal amount into streams 
and tributaries.”303 The state water board conducted a study and 
“found that only 3 percent of rainwater contributes to normal river 
flows, while the other 97 percent either evaporates or is taken up by 
plants.”304 However, by monitoring the experimental collection 
program to measure the amount collected and comparing this to 
“how much precipitation would have made it into streams during the 
same period,” the bill’s proponents hope to show that rainwater 
collection does not significantly impact the normal surface water 
flow.305 Such proof would be helpful to those states wishing to 
promote rainwater harvesting outside of their permitting schemes for 
surface and/or groundwater regulation. 
Rainwater collection is a new water law issue involving an 
ancient water source. In determining the government’s right to 
 
 298. Id.; but see Henetz, supra note 290 (warning that rain water is not necessarily clean and 
should not be harvested for drinking). 
 299. Driscoll, supra note 296, at 01H. 
 300. Id. (noting that although Texas does not regulate rain water as it does municipal water, 
well water, mosquito hazards and gray water, it does suggest that harvesters consider guidelines 
and specifications from other states and has published a rainwater harvesting guide). 
 301. See S. 80, 67th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009), http://www.leg.state.co.us/ 
clics/clics2009a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/49D4349AC4A73794872575370071F5D4?open&file=080_enr.
pdf (authorizing the collection of precipitation from up to 3,000 square feet of a roof of a 
building that is primarily used as a residence and is not connected to a domestic water system 
serving more than 3 single-family dwellings). 
 302. John Schroyer, Rainwater Harvesting Bill May Have Tough Fight, COLO. SPRINGS 
GAZETTE, Feb. 4, 2009, http://www.gazette.com/articles/tough-47395-bill-denver.html. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. 
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regulate or prohibit private behavior in collecting and using this 
resource, it is important to decide whether there exists a property 
right in rainwater and who holds that right.306 Rainwater falling on 
private land that is captured on private land appears to be destined 
for private ownership.307 Nevertheless, just as some states have 
decided that groundwater located beneath private property and 
surface water located under or adjacent to private property are public 
resources,308 rainwater falling on a landowner’s property might 
similarly be considered a public resource owned by the state.309 As the 
public trust doctrine is extended from surface water to groundwater, 
it is possible that the interconnected rainwater resource will also be 
subject to the public trust doctrine.310 Thus, if rainwater is subject to 
regulation as a state water resource and if the public trust doctrine 
prohibits private ownership, landowners will not own the rainwater 
that falls on their land but may only be granted revocable access to 
use of the state’s resource. 
V. EFFECT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS CLASSIFICATION ON LEGAL 
ISSUES 
Constitutional Implications: Takings 
If water is viewed as a private property right, efforts by the 
government to regulate access to the water supply may require that 
just compensation be paid if the regulation interferes with the water 
right to such a degree that it constitutes a “taking” under the Fifth 
 
 306. See Arlene J. Kwasniak & Daniel R. Hursh, Right to Rainwater—A Cloudy Issue, 26 
WINDSOR REV. OF LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 105, 113 (2009) (Can.) (beginning the inquiry into 
whether an ownership interest in rainwater is gained upon capture in Canada by asking 
“whether the Crown claims ownership of rainwater and whether the governing legislation 
provides mechanisms to acquire a right to capture and use rainwater”). 
 307. See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 228 (Tex. 1936) (finding citation of 
authority “[un]necessary to demonstrate that the right of a land owner to the rain water which 
falls on his land is a property right which vest[s]” when ownership in the land vests). 
 308. See infra notes 240–273 and accompanying text. 
 309. See Kwasniak & Hursh, supra note 306, at 113–20 (analyzing whether rainwater falls 
under the statutory meaning of water in Alberta, Canada which defines water as “all water on 
or under the surface of the ground, whether in liquid or solid state”). 
 310. See id. at 110–11 (suggesting that rainwater harvesting could reach a scale where it 
impacts the entire water cycle as well as other human users and wildlife); Bednarz, supra note 
291, 747–48 (noting that, similarly to groundwater, rainwater is included within the public trust 
doctrine because of its connectivity to surface water, but the public’s right to it does not vest 
“until it ends up in a body of public trust encompassed surface water”). 
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Amendment’s Takings Clause.311 If water is viewed as a state resource 
and the government determines that previously granted access to 
water must be reduced or withdrawn, the government will not be 
subject to a takings claim because no private property has been 
implicated.312 As discussed above, classifying water rights as property 
directly impacts whether water users can assert a takings claim, and 
the law is unclear as to whether private property in water exists.313 
To determine whether a taking has occurred, the court must first 
decide whether the plaintiff has a property right impacted by 
government action.314 Secondly, the court must determine whether the 
government has “gone too far” in its regulation and needs to pay just 
compensation.315 Assuming there is a property right in water, water 
rights takings claims can be analyzed as either a per se taking or a 
regulatory taking under Penn Central316 using the ad hoc factual 
inquiry test.317 A per se taking is a permanent physical occupation318 
under Loretto,319 or a denial of all economically viable use320 under 
 
 311. U.S. CONST. amend. V (applied to the states by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) (“nor 
shall private property be taken for a public use, without just compensation”); see also Penn. 
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least is that while property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”). 
 312. See, e.g., Leshy, supra note 12, at 2008 (observing that takings claims have been allowed 
in the past for water rights when “the government was taking water from one group of farmers 
and giving it to another group of farmers” but that a different situation exists when the 
government is benefiting the public at large by limiting private diversions that harm the 
environment); see also Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651, 657 (1927) 
(finding that the state defines land rights and the state’s refusal to grant a riparian owner the 
right to maintain and repair their dam was not a denial of Fourteenth Amendment rights); 
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (concluding that 
since the plaintiff had no claim to the waters at issue there was no basis for a takings claim). 
 313. See Leshy, supra note 12, at 2005–6 (“[C]hronic uncertainty about the validity and 
measure of many water rights has some important implications for takings law.”); Laitos & 
Westfall, supra note 72, at 62 (noting that the extent to which an interest is protected depends 
on its classification as a protectable property interest); supra Parts II–IV. 
 314. Kevin W. Moore, Seized by Nature:  Suggestions on How to Better Protect Animals and 
Property Rights Under the Endangered Species Act, 12 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, 
154 (2008). 
 315. See id. 
 316. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 317. See, e.g., Estate of Hage v. United States (Hage V), 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 212 (2008) (using 
Penn Central factors to determine whether a taking occurred based upon Forest Service policies 
which prevented landowners from accessing and using water on their property). 
 318. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Tulare 
Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318–19 (2001) (holding that 
water users had property rights based on their contracts and that the U.S. government had 
physically taken their rights to preserve endangered species). 
 319. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982). 
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Lucas.321 As discussed previously, both state and federal courts are in 
disarray as to whether property rights in water exist.322 While some 
courts have viewed water rights as property and proceeded with a 
takings analysis,323 other courts have found that no property rights in 
water exist and have dismissed takings claims on the basis that this 
first requirement has not been met. However, some courts stress the 
difference between land ownership rights and usufructuary rights in 
water and then continue in the same decision to find a taking of water 
rights requiring just compensation from the government.324 
Earlier court decisions recognized property rights in water 
sufficient for a takings claim.325 In Dugan v. Rank,326 for example, the 
United States Supreme Court concluded that the U.S. government 
committed a partial taking of water from riparian and overlying 
owners by operating a dam, which would reduce the natural amount 
of water flowing in the San Joaquin River by almost three-fourths.327 
The Court reasoned that because the federal government had the 
right to seize the claimants’ property, federal officers of the Bureau of 
Reclamation had the right to take these water rights by impounding 
water behind the dam, but the U.S. would be required to pay 
damages based upon “the difference in market value of the 
respondents’ land before and after the interference or partial 
taking.”328 The Court explained that “[a] seizure of water rights need 
not necessarily be a physical invasion of land. . . . [and instead] might 
 
 320. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 321. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992). 
 322. See supra Part II. 
 323. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., 307 F.3d at 984. 
 324. See Estate of Hage v. United States (Hage V), 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 211 (2008) (noting the 
difference between water ownership as the right to access and use water and landownership as 
the right to exclude and then finding a taking based on the government fencing around the 
water and streams). 
 325. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Act, 50 Stat. 850 (1937) (providing that Secretary of the 
Interior “may acquire by proceedings in eminent domain, or otherwise, all lands, rights-of-way, 
water rights, and other property necessary for said purposes”); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. 
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294–99 (1958) (recognizing a property right but finding no taking); 
United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 752–54 (1950) (finding the riparian 
owner held flood water rights which could only be acquired by the government through 
condemnation or acquisition); Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399, 405–08 (1931) 
(finding a taking of International Paper’s water rights). 
 326. 372 U.S. 609 (1963). 
 327. Id. at 620–21. 
 328. Id. at 622–25. 
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be analogized to interference or partial taking of air space over 
land.”329 
Some recent decisions also recognize property rights in water. In 
Estate of Hage v. United States (Hage V), the Court of Federal Claims 
acknowledged that “[t]he surface waters which flow from federal land 
to Plaintiffs’ patented lands are a vested water right.”330 However, the 
Hage V decision clarified the extent of this vested water right by 
distinguishing between having title to the water and owning the right 
to use the water.331 The Hage V court noted that there is a “difference 
between water ownership and real property ownership; water is a 
usufructuary as opposed to a possessory right.”332 Nevertheless, even 
without recognizing the landowner’s water rights as title ownership, 
the court held that “the Government’s construction of fences around 
the water and streams amounts to a physical taking during the time 
period in which Plaintiffs still had a grazing permit and their cattle 
had the right to water at these streams.”333 The Hage V court also used 
the Penn Central factors to find that the Forest Service’s actions in 
allowing brush to overgrow the stream beds and preventing the 
riparian landowners from clearing it severely reduced the water flow 
to their land and constituted a taking based upon the severe economic 
impact they suffered.334 Thus, while calling water a usufructuary right 
that is different from real property ownership, the court still found a 
private property right in water sufficient to support a takings claim 
against federal interference. 
The Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States335 
decision by the Court of Federal Claims identified the property 
subject to a taking as the “contractually-conferred right to the use of 
water.”336 The Tulare court recognized that “under California law the 
title to water always remains with the state,”337 but concluded “that 
plaintiffs’ right to the use of water is a compensable contractual 
right.”338 The court determined that this “right to use” the water was 
 
 329. Id. at 625. 
 330. Estate of Hage v. United States (Hage V), 82 Fed. Cl. 202, 210 (2008) (citing Hage v. 
United States (Hage IV), 51 Fed. Cl. 570 (2002)). 
 331. Id. at 210–11. 
 332. Id. at 211. 
 333. Id. 
 334. Id. at 212. 
 335. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). 
 336. Id. at 314. 
 337. Id. at 318 (citing CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (Deering 1977)). 
 338. Id. at 318 n.6. 
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taken when the federal government preserved water to protect fish 
under the Endangered Species Act and “rendered the usufructuary 
right to that water valueless,” thus effectuating a “physical taking.”339 
The court’s language makes it difficult to decipher whether the court 
found a per se taking under Loretto as a permanent physical 
occupation, or under Lucas as a denial of all economically viable 
use.340 If decided based upon the Loretto standard, the decision can be 
criticized because Loretto requires that the physical occupation be 
permanent, and the water reduction at issue in the Tulare case was 
only temporary.341 If viewed under Lucas, there is a strong argument 
that, under the exception to a Lucas per se taking, the background 
principles of California’s public trust doctrine would have precluded 
the water users from arguing they had a property right to continue 
receiving water to the detriment of the public interest in an 
endangered species of fish.342 Nevertheless, many commentators 
criticize the view adopted in Tulare343 and affirmed by the Federal 
Circuit in Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States,344 which 
treats the government’s restrictions on water deliveries as physical 
takings instead of regulatory takings.345 
In the Casitas case, the Federal Circuit reviewed a Court of 
Federal Claims opinion issued by Judge John P. Wiese, the same trial 
judge who had earlier written the Tulare decision. Whereas in Tulare 
Judge Wiese held that the government had physically taken a water 
right when it reserved water for endangered species, in Casitas the 
 
 339. Id. at 319 (comparing this denial of a right to use water to the invasion of air space 
above a landowner’s property found to be a taking in United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 
(1946)). 
 340. See Grant, supra note 62, at 1363–64 (noting that commentators have criticized this 
decision and “have particularly lambasted [Judge Wiese’s] ruling that the water delivery 
reductions were a per se physical taking rather than a regulatory taking in the Penn Central 
balancing category”). 
 341. See id. at 1364; Leshy, supra note 12, at 2011–13. 
 342. See Houck, supra note 15, at 320–21 (noting that government restrictions to protect 
wildlife resources is a background principle and citing Sierra Club v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire 
Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 347 (Ct. App. 1993) (depublished), which applied Lucas and stated 
that “‘wildlife regulation of some sort has been historically part of the pre-existing law of 
property,’ and thus would fall within its (enigmatic) ‘nuisance’ exception”). 
 343. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 318 (2001). 
 344. 543 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 345. See, e.g., Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 8, at 315 (opining that “[t]he Tulare decision 
appears to have applied the wrong test [in holding] that regulatory restrictions on water delivery 
amounted to a physical taking of the plaintiffs’ property interest in the water, making the 
restrictions per se takings” and arguing that such a rule “should not be applied in the context of 
restrictions on water deliveries”); Parobek, supra note 11, at 212–14. 
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Judge determined that diversion of water by the United States did not 
constitute a physical taking.346 The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit reversed Judge Wiese’s finding of no government taking, 
concluding that the diversion of water for a fish ladder was a physical 
taking of water from Casitas.347 Judge Wiese changed his approach 
between Tulare and Casitas based on the intervening Tahoe-Sierra 
decision, most likely because he viewed the diversion as a temporary 
taking of water instead of a permanent physical occupation. 
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit stressed that the diversion was 
permanent in that “[t]he water, and Casitas’ right to use that water, is 
forever gone.”348 In dissent, Judge Mayer argued that the takings 
claim should not have been analyzed as a per se taking but instead 
should have been subject to the “multi-factor inquiry set out in Penn 
Central” as decided by the trial court.349 The Federal Circuit declared 
that physical diversions of water by the government should be 
analyzed as a physical taking rather than a regulatory taking, even 
though, as the dissent pointed out, the government regulation 
required that Casitas leave more water in the river to comply with the 
ESA, and Casitas had several options to meet this requirement.350 
Unfortunately, the Casitas decision does not shed much light on 
whether the right to water is a property right subject to a takings 
claim. For purposes of the summary judgment motion at issue in the 
case, the government “conceded that Casitas has a valid property 
right in the water in question.”351 Therefore, the Casitas court did not 
address whether there is a property right in water to support a takings 
claim, and we must await resolution at the trial court before the 
alleged diversion action is analyzed as a physical taking. The Casitas 
dissent observed that “Casitas does not own the water in question 
 
 346. Casitas Mun. Water Dist., 543 F.3d. at 1283 (explaining that Judge Wiese concluded that 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), which 
was decided after his opinion in Tulare, clarified takings law such that he was compelled to 
reach a different result in Casitas). 
 347. Id. at 1296. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. at 1297–98 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and noting that Casitas conceded that it would not prevail on its 
takings claim under the Penn Central test). 
 350. Id. at 1300–01 (observing that “it was Casitas who initiated Reclamation’s Section 7 
ESA consultations with the National Marine Fisheries Service and suggested use of the fish 
passage facility to ensure ESA compliance” as the most economical way to comply with the 
federal statute). 
 351. Id. at 1288 (majority opinion). 
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because all water sources within California belong to the public,”352 
and since California subjects water rights permits to the public trust 
doctrine, there can be no takings claim if there is no property interest 
in the water.353 “[B]ecause Casitas possesses a usufructuary interest in 
the water and does not actually own the water molecules at issue, it is 
difficult to imagine how its property interest in the water could be 
physically invaded or occupied.”354 
On February 17, 2009, the Federal Circuit denied a petition for 
panel rehearing and rehearing en banc of the Casitas appellate 
decision on the summary judgment motion. The three circuit judges 
concurring in the decision not to rehear the case explained that the 
government diverted water from Casitas for public use and that based 
on Supreme Court precedent, water diversions are considered to be 
physical takings.355 The three circuit judges who dissented from the 
denial of petition for rehearing en banc opined that even if Casitas 
does have a property right, it is only a usufructuary right to divert 
water and cannot be analyzed as a physical taking, but rather should 
be analyzed as a regulatory taking under Penn Central as a limitation 
on use, not an occupation of property.356 It appears as though the 
United States government will not seek review by the United States 
Supreme Court as the July 2009 deadline passed without the 
government filing a petition for writ of certiorari.357 Nonetheless, 
future litigation at the trial court level may generate issues that might 
eventually lead to a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court about 
property rights in water. The issue may well be framed as whether 
government interference with water rights to preserve endangered 
species will result in a successful takings claim under the Fifth or 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
 
 352. Id. at 1297 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citing CAL. WATER CODE §§ 102, 1001 (Deering 
1977)). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 1298. 
 355. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 556 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Moore, 
J., concurring) (citing Int’l Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931); United States v. 
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950); Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963)). 
 356. Id. at 1336 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (noting that in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 
296 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the Federal Circuit “treated a requirement that a 
landowner not cut and utilize trees that are used for owl nesting as a regulatory taking”). 
 357. James S. Mattson, Casitas Municipal Water District Revisited, GRAND THEFT: 
PROPERTY (Aug. 10, 2009), http://mattsonlaw.blogspot.com/2009/08/casitas-municipal-water-
district.html. 
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No property rights in water were recognized by the Court of 
Federal Claims in Klamath Irrigation District,358 except as created 
based upon contracts between the water users and the United States, 
which held ownership title to the water according to Oregon state 
law.359 As discussed previously, the water users in Klamath were 
restricted to remedies under contract law and were precluded from 
asserting their takings claim because they did not have a property 
right under Oregon law.360 Nebraska decisions appear to similarly 
restrict private ownership of water rights.361 The Nebraska Supreme 
Court in Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Nebraska Department of Natural 
Resources (Spear II)362 did not reach this question, but found that an 
inverse condemnation claim by surface water users adversely 
impacted by groundwater withdrawals could not be asserted because 
the government agency “did not have authority to regulate ground 
water users or administer ground water rights for the benefit of 
surface water appropriators.”363 Although the same court had stated 
in its earlier Spear I decision that “[a] right to appropriate surface 
water however, is not an ownership of property” for purposes of 
supporting a claim for conversion or trespass,364 it based its Spear II 
takings claim decision on the government’s lack of a duty to act, 
rather than on the lack of a property interest held by the plaintiff 
water user.365 Clearly, there are discrepancies among and within state 
and federal jurisdictions366 as to whether water users have a 
protectable property interest that will support a legal claim requiring 
the existence of a property right.367 
The public trust doctrine has served to defeat takings claims for 
interference with water rights as courts find that the government, not 
 
 358. Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 524 (2005). 
 359. Id. at 523–24. 
 360. Id. at 540 (concluding that landowners have potential contract claims only as against 
the United States); see also supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text. 
 361. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 736–37 (noting that the Spear I decision is 
problematic and that earlier Nebraska courts had concluded that surface water appropriators 
“did in fact possess vested property rights”). 
 362. 699 N.W.2d 379 (2005). 
 363. Id. at 386. 
 364. Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub (Spear I), 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (2005). 
 365. 699 N.W.2d at 387 
 366. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 738 (“Outside of the navigational servitude context, 
the federal courts have been wildly inconsistent regarding takings claims brought by 
appropriators with state-sanctioned water rights.”). 
 367. See, e.g., In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (Or. 1924) (“No one has any property in 
the water itself, but a simple usufruct.”). 
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private individuals and entities, owns these rights. Although there was 
not an explicit takings claim at issue in National Audubon v. Superior 
Court,368 the California Supreme Court held, 
The state has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into 
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to 
protect public trust uses whenever feasible. . . . 
Once the state has approved an appropriation, the public trust 
imposes a duty of continuing supervision over the taking and use of 
the appropriated water. In [doing so,] the state is not confined by 
past allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light of current 
knowledge or inconsistent with current needs.369 
Thus, the state should not be required to pay just compensation 
to a permitee if it later decides that water needs to be kept instream 
to support wildlife. While the public trust doctrine has also been used 
to overcome takings claims for interference with shoreline interests, 
particularly in the East, these cases are beyond the scope of this 
article as they deal with real property interests in land, not water 
rights.370 
Constitutional Implications: Givings 
Under the public trust doctrine, if water is determined to belong 
to the state in trust for the people, it cannot become private property 
unless the state temporarily “gives” it to a private owner and such a 
“giving” may also be constitutionally constrained.371 The public trust 
doctrine serves as a “protection against unfettered givings” of public 
resources in the same way the Takings Clause serves as a protection 
 
 368. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
 369. Id. at 728. 
 370. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 985–87 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(affirming district court holding that development proposal “was inconsistent with the public 
trust that the State of Washington is obligated to protect” and the public trust constitutes a 
“background principle” of state law that prevents the landowner from asserting a takings claim 
under Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council); Rouse v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 524 S.E.2d 455, 460–61 
(Ga. 1999) (holding that state Protection of Tidewaters Act as applied does not constitute a 
taking because “Rouse has no protectable property interest that would permit him to maintain 
his structures on public tidewaters”); Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d 604, 608–09 (N.H. 1994) 
(state legislative bill for public use of coastal beaches, “which recognizes that the public trust 
extends to those lands ‘subject to ebb and flow of the tide’” does not constitute a taking of 
property). 
 371. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 563 (“[O]ur taxonomy of takings applies 
with equal validity to givings.”). 
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against a powerful government absconding with private property.372 
Accepting that under the Takings Clause it is unfair to “‘force some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole,’” it is also unfair “to bestow 
a benefit upon some people that, in all fairness and justice, should be 
given to the public as a whole.”373 
As explained by Professors Abraham Bell and Gideon 
Parchomovsky in their seminal article entitled Givings, a government 
“giving” occurs when the state: (1) “grants a property interest to a 
private actor;” (2) “uses its regulatory power to enhance the value of 
certain private properties;” or (3) “indirectly increases the value of 
property by engaging in a physical or regulatory giving or taking.”374 
For example, a physical giving results when the state grants a 
broadcasting license or a cable easement,375 cattle grazing rights, 
mineral rights, or logging rights on public land.376 A regulatory giving 
occurs where “the state eliminates development restrictions in 
wetlands.”377 A so-called derivative giving would “include the building 
of a park or the shutting down of a power plant in a residential 
area.”378 
Assuming water is a state-owned resource, it could be argued 
that a physical giving occurs when the state, through its water law 
doctrines, grants water rights to private landowners, as riparians or 
prior appropriators, to irrigate their crops, or for other reasonable 
uses.379 Regulatory givings also occur when the federal government 
heavily subsidizes the cost of water to encourage agriculture in the 
arid western states.380 Finally, derivative givings may occur when the 
 
 372. See id. at 553–54 (“[W]hen the state permits logging companies to chop down trees in 
national forests for lumber, it is forcing the public as a whole to surrender natural resources for 
the private profit of the logging companies.”). 
 373. Id. at 554 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)); see also id. at 
578 (“From the vantage point of fairness, the law of takings is concerned with the allocation of 
burdens; our proposed law of givings focuses on the allocation of benefits.”). 
 374. Id. at 551; see also Dibadj, supra note 18, at 1045 (crediting Charles Reich’s law review 
article, The New Property, as first exploring the concept of “givings”). 
 375. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 551. 
 376. Id. at 563. 
 377. Id. at 551. 
 378. Id. 
 379. For example, how different is granting water rights for irrigation purposes from 
“permit[ting] logging companies to chop down trees” in state owned forests? See id. at 554. 
 380. See, e.g., REISNER, supra note 159, at 500 (“Only a government that disposes of a 
billion dollars every few hours would still be selling water in deserts for less than a penny a ton. 
And only an agency as antediluvian as the Bureau of Reclamation, hiding in a government as 
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government builds water supply infrastructures such as reservoirs, 
irrigation ditches, and aqueducts, which subsequently increase the 
value of land previously incapable of supporting economically viable 
crops.381 
At a minimum, the government should not be required to 
compensate water users for a taking when it finds it necessary to 
reduce or eliminate access to water to protect public resources.382 In 
fact, the government should be required, through its contracts with 
water users such as farmers, irrigation districts, and municipalities, to 
obtain the appropriate market value for water use rights so that 
economic forces promote efficient utilization of this resource.383 Such 
changes in pricing strategy will help ensure that private individuals 
and entities do not unfairly benefit from the state’s largesse to the 
detriment of the public as a whole.384 As Professors Bell and 
Parchomovsky conclude, “[c]harging for givings would reduce 
interest-group politics, enhance the efficiency of government 
decisions, and improve the fairness of our property system.”385 Thus, it 
would appear to be viable to operate a market in a state-owned water 
resource that is properly valued. 
 
elephantine as ours, could successfully camouflage the enormous losses the taxpayer has to bear 
for its generosity.”); Garance Burke, AP Impact: Feds Pay Farmers to Till Arid Land, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009052162_ 
apsubsidizingthirstycrops.html (noting that the federal government handed out more than $687 
million in subsidies between 2007 and 2009 to hundreds of farmers in California and Arizona); 
ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, DOUBLE DIPPERS: HOW BIG AG TAPS INTO TAXPAYERS’ 
POCKETS—TWICE (2005), available at http://www.ewg.org/reports/doubledippers (finding that 
in 2002 one in five Central Valley Project farms received both water and crop subsidies, 
receiving water subsidies totaling an estimated $121.5 million). 
 381. See REISNER, supra note 159, at 117 (noting that certain parcels of land were worth fifty 
times more after the land owners irrigated their parcels of land with the assistance of interest 
free loans from the federal government); CONG. BUDGET OFF., CURRENT COST-SHARING AND 
FINANCING POLICIES FOR FEDERAL AND STATE WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT, at iii 
(July 1983), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/50xx/doc5029/doc11-Entire.pdf (“The 
federal government spends several billion dollars each year to plan, construct, and maintain 
water projects for navigation, irrigation, flood control, hydropower, recreation, and other 
purposes.”). 
 382. See Leshy, supra note 12, at 2023 (observing that “the nation’s taxpayers have been 
bestowing gifts on farmers for decades” and it would be anomalous to require the taxpayers to 
compensate the farmers when it decides to “end the gift-giving”). 
 383. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 16, at 590–92 (discussing when the government 
should charge for a benefit and how should the charge be assessed and collected). 
 384. See id. at 601 (“[P]ayment of compensation for a taking, or assessment of a charge for a 
giving, should reflect the net effect of all givings and takings befalling the property owner.”). 
 385. Id. at 618. 
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If we treat water as a public resource owned by the state, the 
state must establish a pricing system for both the initial allocation of 
access rights and the continuing water usage rights such that the 
public as a whole benefits. If a giving has already occurred, such as 
with the grant of water rights to prior appropriators and riparians, the 
public trust doctrine can be used to remedy this giving since the 
government should have “the right to revoke a grant conferred under 
the public trust.”386 The implied reservation of government rights may 
also preclude a takings claim as such reserved rights are not subject to 
private ownership.387 
Other Constitutional Challenges 
Water rights may not be considered property for purposes of a 
takings claim but may nonetheless be considered due process 
property.388 In addition to a takings claim, litigants seeking a remedy 
from the government for interference with their water rights may 
assert claims that the government action has deprived them of due 
process (procedural and/or substantive) and/or equal protection. 
However, some federal courts have held that federal substantive due 
process claims are not allowed where the alleged violation can be 
addressed by a Fifth Amendment takings claim.389 The Ninth Circuit 
in Esplanade Properties v. City of Seattle390 not only affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of a federal substantive due process claim for 
the city’s denial of a shoreline property development application, but 
it also dismissed the landowner’s state substantive due process claim 
on the basis that other constitutional provisions were available under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.391 
 
 386. Dibadj, supra note 18, at 1110. 
 387. See supra notes 125–136 and accompanying text (discussing federal and state reserved 
rights). 
 388. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 732. 
 389. See, e.g., Esplanade Props., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996). But see Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 
1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2008) (rejecting the argument “that any claim that governmental action 
caused a diminution in the value of real property involves the Takings Clause, not the Due 
Process Clause,” and clarifying that Armendariz does not “create a blanket prohibition of all 
property-related substantive due process claims”); Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa 
Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the holding in 
Armendariz had been affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), which “signaled that substantive due process can be an appropriate 
vehicle to challenge the rationality of land use regulations”). 
 390. 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 391. Id. at 983. 
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Courts have also allowed substantive due process claims to be 
asserted when a regulatory takings claim was dismissed as unripe. 
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s view in Esplanade Properties that a 
takings claim precludes a substantive due process claim, the court in 
Coates v. Hall392 explained that “[t]he Fifth Circuit has refused to 
adopt a ‘blanket rule’ that a takings claim subsumes any substantive 
due process claim related to a deprivation of property.”393 Although 
the Coates court allowed the plaintiff to assert both a substantive due 
process claim and an equal protection claim in addition to a takings 
claim for the government’s restriction on groundwater withdrawal, it 
found that both these claims required dismissal based on ripeness.394 
The court concluded that under the particular facts of the case before 
it, the substantive due process claim and the equal protection claim 
were the same as the takings claim, which had been dismissed for 
ripeness for failure to obtain a final decision on the government’s 
groundwater restriction.395 Thus, while it may be possible to assert 
substantive due process, equal protection, and even procedural due 
process396 claims in addition to a takings claim,397 the factual 
circumstances of most cases will likely preclude a claimant from 
maintaining these actions separate from the takings analysis. 
Under the public trust doctrine, the property right to water 
should remain with the state. Access to water may be granted by the 
government to individual water users, but such permits should be 
treated as revocable licenses, not subject to compensation upon 
revocation, similar to federal grazing rights.398 Water rights have 
consistently been identified as usufructuary, which precludes 
 
 392. 512 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2007). 
 393. Id. at 789 (citing FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 93 F.3d 167, 171 n.5 (5th 
Cir. 1996); Simi Inv. Co. v. Harris Cnty., 236 F.3d 240, 248 (5th Cir. 2000)) 
 394. Id. at 790–91. 
 395. Id. 
 396. See, e.g., Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 742 (discussing Sheep Mountain Cattle Co. 
v. Dep’t of Ecology, 726 P.2d 55, 57 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), in which “the court construed a 
water right as property for due process purposes . . . [and] found that the state violated 
procedural due process by issuing a termination order without providing notice or a hearing to a 
water rights holder who had failed to show continuous beneficial use of the water”). 
 397. See id. at 745 (concluding that although water users in most prior appropriation states 
will be precluded from having a possessory property right sufficient to support a takings claim, 
“it does not preclude them from having due process or common law property”). 
 398. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 492–93 (1973) (holding that government does 
not need to compensate a grazing permit holder for the value of the permit if the government 
condemns the fee lands). 
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ownership rights and entitles the holder to rights of access and use.399 
A usufructuary permit should be subject to revocation by the 
government owner, without compensation being required under the 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. When the government gives a 
water right to a private individual, such a right entitles the user to 
enjoy the benefits of this right so long as any contractual obligations, 
such as paying for the right, are observed and the public interest, as 
expressed in laws such as the Endangered Species Act, is supported. 
Water Marketing & Privatization 
Identifying the nature of property rights in water will also affect 
the viability of a market in water rights.400 A viable water market, 
implemented to encourage water usage efficiency and to keep more 
water instream,401 would require some degree of certainty in the water 
rights valuation.402 Using a tradable permit system to establish such a 
market would necessitate adequate security provided to permit 
holders.403 The value of water rights will depend upon the legal 
protection given to these interests as against private and 
governmental interference.404 
The emissions trading schemes instituted under the Clean Air 
Act create private interests in the sky through tradable emissions 
permits designed to encourage reductions in air pollution through 
 
 399. See, e.g., Red Canyon Sheep Co. v. Ickes, 98 F.2d 308, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1938) (“[T]he 
[water] right itself is something less than the full ownership of property because it is a right not 
to the corpus of the water but to the use of the water.”). 
 400. See Levy & Friedman, supra note 175, at 524–25 (“[T]he valuation of goods having no 
close substitutes, including many disputed natural resources, can be highly sensitive to the 
definition of property rights.”). 
 401. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 239–46 (promoting the use of market incentives, rather 
than governmental power, to achieve water conservation and the increase of instream flows for 
environmental protection). 
 402. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 745 (“In order for water users to execute water 
transfers, engage in water banking, conserve streamflows, or participate in a myriad of 
beneficial uses, it is important to have a clear characterization of which incidents of property 
inhere in a water right.”); Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 8, at 339–40 (noting that uncertainty 
about legal rights and responsibilities make “it excruciatingly difficult for water markets to 
move water to more socially valuable uses”). 
 403. Tietenberg, supra note 15, at 267–68. 
 404. See Zellmer & Harder, supra note 4, at 745 (“[A]dequate remedies for real world 
disputes between users must be available for the legal system to function and to evolve in a 
fashion that promotes both stability and the full range of values associated with water.”); Levy 
& Friedman, supra note 175, at 494 (noting that in order to properly allocate and redistribute 
goods, “property rights must be well defined and enforceable”). 
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economic incentives.405 Professor Gerald Torres proposed that air is 
not government-owned property but is instead public property which 
should be managed by the government as an asset held in trust for the 
people.406 As a trustee, the government must protect the air resource 
and cannot give the property away to private interests.407 Professor 
Torres concluded that the public trust doctrine should be extended to 
“the pollution and carbon loading capacity of the atmosphere” such 
that it provides a way “to both capture the value of the sky resource 
for the people as a whole and to supervise the government dealings in 
relationship to the carrying capacity of the atmosphere.”408 Water can 
be similarly viewed, with the government holding the water resource 
in trust for the people and managing that asset for sustainability. 
Air pollution control market solutions through cap and trade 
permits are based on a specified amount of tons of emissions allowed 
in a given region.409 Water markets will necessarily require a more 
flexible management system because of the uncertainty of water 
supply, which “can vary significantly from year to year, implying that 
caps are likely to vary from year to year.”410 Tradable permit systems 
for fisheries may be a more appropriate model for water rights than 
the air pollution model because such fishery systems must also 
respond to seasonally changing conditions without drastically 
impacting the value of these investments.411 However, United States 
fisheries have also had difficulty meeting sustainability goals, even 
though this government ownership model for natural resources has 
attempted to solve the tragedy of the commons problems by 
mimicking sole ownership by a private entity.412 
 
 405. See Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 560–62 (2002) 
(explaining that under the Coase theorem, “a trading scheme exploits the differences [among 
firms that have different marginal cost curves for controlling pollution] and encourages firms to 
re-allocate reduction efforts to the sources that have the lowest-cost opportunities to reduce 
pollution [through market transactions]”). 
 406. Id. at 573. 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at 532. 
 409. See Tietenberg, supra note 15, at 268. 
 410. Id. (“Since different users have quite different capacities for responding to shortfalls, 
the system for allocating this water needs to be flexible enough to respond to this variability or 
the water could be seriously misallocated.”). 
 411. See id. (suggesting that the need for allocating water has been met “by a combination of 
technological solutions (principally water storage) and building some flexibility into the rights 
system”). 
 412. See generally Josh Eagle, A Window into the Regulated Commons: The Takings Clause, 
Investment Security, and Sustainability, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (2007). 
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The United States has attempted to control overfishing and 
overinvestment in the fishing industry by having government agencies 
set annual allocations (quotas) based upon scientific advice about 
available catch levels.413 This model of sole ownership in the 
government is an economic solution based on the theory that such 
ownership “rationalizes resource use by eliminating wasteful 
competition for the resource among fishermen and by internalizing 
individually generated externalities.”414 However, as a “private” 
owner, the government must both regulate to limit resource use and 
facilitate the investment by fishermen to extract the resource.415 While 
this model for commercial fishing management may have its 
limitations, the underlying issues about natural resource economics 
are very applicable to our water management challenges. Like fish, 
the available water supply is dependent upon natural conditions, 
which may vary drastically from season to season and year to year 
and are currently out of direct human control. As a common 
resource, both water and fish are subject to a tragedy of the commons 
scenario, which may be partially resolved by private ownership.416 
Government ownership of the common resource in trust for the 
public may be the best (although not necessarily ideal) method to 
manage a natural resource that is critical to the public good.417 
Tradable permit systems for air emissions and fisheries have not 
required that private property rights exist in either the clean air or the 
actual fish.418 Instead, these markets have been established based on a 
usage allocation controlled by government regulators, hopefully for 
the benefit of the public.419 Putting aside for a moment the question of 
private property rights in water, quantifying the allocation is 
important to valuing these rights and is also important to the 
 
 413. See id. at 644–46 (discussing the Magnuson-Stevens Act and the efforts of the Gulf of 
Mexico Fishery Management Council). 
 414. Id. at 643 (noting, however, that there is a distinction between public and private 
ownership in that the government is not profit oriented like a private owner is). 
 415. See id. at 623–24. 
 416. See id. at 622–23. 
 417. See id. at 654 (“In order for government ownership to succeed, management 
institutions must take into account the incentives of the entrepreneurs embedded within 
them.”). 
 418. See Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(holding that the government owns the right to fish and that fishermen have a license to catch 
fish but do not have a property interest subject to a takings claim). 
 419. But see Arnold, supra note 5, at 831–32 (“[P]rivatization and commodification fail to 
achieve economic integrity and sustainability.”). 
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development of a water market.420 However, water rights, particularly 
under the prior appropriation doctrine, have typically been defined 
based upon usage, not quantity, and while allocation based on usage 
may be efficient, it may not be fair as “[t]hose who are initially able to 
obtain the largest water rights reap the benefits of future trades to 
more beneficial uses.”421 Thus, any tradable permit system in water 
will necessitate policy decisions about how to quantify and allocate 
initial water rights and whether this initial allocation will be based 
upon historical usage and priorities established as part of our water 
law regimes. 
Professor Craig Arnold has addressed privatizing water as a 
national security and human rights issue and concludes that to 
control, manage, and allocate water, our legal system and public 
institutions should use a public stewardship concept “based in public 
ownership of water with recognition and protection of private 
interests in water.”422 Professor Arnold posits that both human rights 
and national security protections are inadequate to meet basic human 
water needs because of the “deeply entrenched conceptualization of 
rights in the United States” and proposes that private control over 
water sources and systems should be limited.423 He suggests that the 
United States adopt principles of public stewardship of water 
resources “premised on the concept that the government is a trustee 
of water resources for the public.”424 
Noting that there is a global trend toward the privatization of 
water and the supporting infrastructure, Professor Arnold expresses 
concern that “tensions between water privatization and human rights 
in developing countries cause great unrest.”425 Although this article 
does not address the concerns about international water supplies, it is 
 
 420. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 229 (“A primary advantage of quantification is that the 
number of units to which a property right applies remains constant, thereby making questions 
about the distinction between one owner’s rights and another’s predictable and relatively easy 
to determine.”). 
 421. Id. at 229–30; see also id. at 230 (“Prior appropriation incorporates the best of both 
systems by utilizing use measures to define and allocate water rights, and by implementing a 
quantity measure for the purposes of transfer.”). 
 422. Arnold, supra note 5, at 849. 
 423. Id. at 789. 
 424. Id. (noting that this public stewardship is “a fiduciary obligation not limited to the 
traditional public trust doctrine, but based in the many public characteristics of water in the 
United States, as well as the social and human necessities of a complex society”). 
 425. Id. at 798 (“Water privatization in the developing world has been met with public 
opposition and conflict, as opponents argue that water is a human right and that global 
corporations are exploiting the needs of the world’s poor for profit.”). 
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noteworthy that the privatization of water by countries in cooperation 
with large corporations is viewed as a matter of national security by 
the government, while residents, especially the poor, may experience 
the adverse impact of high prices and service cut-offs.426 Grassroots 
organizations in Latin America are resisting this privatization and 
have demanded water justice to fight what they fear is the 
commodification of their country’s water for the benefit of foreign 
corporations.427 Privatization and commodification of water may help 
to some degree by moving scarce water to its highest and most 
efficient use through market forces. However, transitioning to a 
private interest model may have severe consequences for human 
rights and survival as commodification degrades the sustainability of 
this precious natural resource. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Property rights in water depend upon state law to the extent that 
constitutional or legislative pronouncements establish or negate 
private claims to a protectable interest in water. 428 State rules are 
diverse and govern whether water users can claim property rights for 
purposes of investing in and trading these rights or for protecting 
against government interference. California has conferred only a 
fragile right in water as it recognizes the public trust doctrine as a 
constraint on private ownership of public resources.429 Other states, 
which similarly restrain such private rights, also grant only conditional 
property rights and are unlikely to protect water users from 
government interference in favor of public resources, such as 
endangered species. 
As states adopt the public trust doctrine or extend it to include 
all state waters,430 property rights proponents will question the court’s 
authority to take property rights without compensation based upon 
 
 426. See generally Maude Barlow & Tony Clarke, The Struggle for Latin America’s Water, 
GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (Jul. 2004), http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/ 
content/article/215-global-public-goods/46052-the-struggle-for-latin-americas-water.pdf. 
 427. See id. (“The destruction of water sources, combined with inequitable access, has left 
most Latin Americans ‘water poor.’”). 
 428. See Mulvaney, supra note 8, at 370–71. 
 429. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 58 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); 
Gray, supra note 32, at 26 (“In states such as California that—by constitutional mandate, 
statutory directive, and common law doctrine—have conferred only a conditional and fragile 
property right in water, few water rights takings cases are likely to succeed.”). 
 430. See In re Water Use Applications (Wai’ahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445–46 (Haw. 2000) 
(extending public trust to groundwater). 
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judicial decision.431 However, to meet sustainability goals for human 
survival and ecological health as the demand for water increases, we 
must change our concept of water rights. Rather than start with the 
premise that there are private property rights in water, subject to 
restrictions as discussed above, we should instead treat water as a 
public resource managed by the government in trust for the people.432 
Under the public trust doctrine, federal reserved rights, or the 
navigational servitude, the state or federal government can assert 
ownership over water in trust for the public such that any water rights 
given to a private individual or entity for access and use will be 
restricted by the public interest in these water resources. We should 
consider access to water and its use as interests similar to grazing, 
fishing, or timber cutting permits, which do not convey an ownership 
interest as the government cannot sell public interests it holds in trust 
for the people. However, water interests conveyed by the government 
to a private party may be protected against claims from other private 
users based upon principles such as prior appropriation or 
riparianism, so long as these interests are not adverse to the public 
interest. 
Private users should be required to pay market value for the 
right to use water, or such grants of access should be considered as 
potentially unconstitutional “givings” in derogation of the public 
trust. Although contracts may be modified based upon subsequent 
legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act,433 assuming water 
usage interests are contractually granted by the government to 
private users, these contract rights will be protected under contract 
law principles.434 The government, as the ultimate title owner of 
property rights in water, holds it in trust for the people and should not 
be required to pay just compensation for a taking when it reserves 
water for the public benefit. Particularly when the government has 
granted rights to use water at a value markedly below its worth, the 
public should not be required to pay for taking back valuable rights it 
 
 431. See generally, Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. 
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 129 S. Ct. 2792 (2009) (No. 08-1151) (addressing issues in terms of 
“judicial taking” in reviewing Florida Supreme Court’s decision upholding legislation impacting 
waterfront owners’ rights to shoreline property); Callies & Chipchase, supra note 27, at 73–74 
(arguing that an expansion of the public trust doctrine amounts to a taking of property which 
must be compensated for). 
 432. See Arnold, supra note 5, at 807–08. 
 433. See Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 537 (2005). 
 434. Id. at 540 (concluding that water rights in the case at hand “take the form of contract 
claims and will be resolved as such”). 
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has given to private users. Water is fluid and too unlike land to be 
treated as a property interest and held by private individuals. Instead, 
it should be held by the state in trust for the public good. 
 
 
